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1I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THESIS STATEMENT  
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a playable CyberCIEGE scenario that 
provides security training and education in a new and more entertaining fashion.  
Specifically this thesis will produce a scenario that illustrates some of the issues 
associated with connecting an internal network to the Internet.  The results of this thesis 
will contribute to the mission of the current CyberCIEGE project being conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California.  The CyberCIEGE project mission is to 
“create an Information Assurance (IA) teaching/learning laboratory”. [Irvine 2003]  This 
thesis will provide the CyberCIEGE project with a playable game scenario customized to 
focus its training on a specific aspect of IA and numerous test scenarios that will test the 
CyberCIEGE game engine’s ability to produce results that meet the scenario developer’s 
expectations.  These results will provide valuable research that, in conjunction with the 
rest of the CyberCIEGE project, will facilitate the final goal of the overall project. 
To conduct this thesis two questions must be asked and answered.  First, can a 
CyberCIEGE scenario be developed such that it is simultaneously a playable game and 
an educational tool that illustrates confidentiality issues in an internal corporate network 
connected to the Internet?  Second, is it possible to validate that the CyberCIEGE game 
engine produces expected results from a predefined1 scenario definition file.  By 
answering these questions, the usability and flexibility provided by a scenario definition 
file as well as the performance of the game engine will be validated and thus will help 
advance the goals of the CyberCIEGE project. 
 
B. THESIS SCOPE  
To answer the first question posed, this thesis will provide a playable 
CyberCIEGE game scenario, utilizing Scenario Definition Files (SDF), that illustrate the 
issues involved with ensuring information confidentiality in a networked computer 
system environment.  Additionally, to answer the second question, this thesis will provide 
                                                 
1 Predefined in relation to a Scenario Definition File refers to a file in which all game play decisions 
have been made prior to executing the game simulation. 
2a test strategy for validating that the CyberCIEGE game engine produces results, from a 
predefined SDF, which both meets preconceived expectations and produces a game 
simulation that unfolds in a realistic and acceptable manner. 
 
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be developed in six chapters.  The thesis chapters will be laid out 
in the following order: 
• Chapter I - Introduction – This chapter will introduce the project and 
discuss the motivation behind this thesis. 
• Chapter II – Background – This chapter will provide the background 
information necessary to understand this thesis. 
• Chapter III – Scenario Goals – This chapter describes the intended 
audience for the CyberCIEGE game as well as the specific educational 
goals of the SDF included.  
• Chapter IV – Scenario Description – This chapter will describe, in detail, 
the playable game scenario that was developed for this thesis.  It includes 
a narrative description of the “virtual world” that is being modeled as well 
as a description of the users, policies, assets, components, and potential 
attacks. 
• Chapter V - Testing – The testing methodology, test cases, and test results 
will be discussed. 
• Chapter VI - Future Work & Conclusion – This chapter will suggest 
potential areas for further research, as well as some final thoughts on the 
project and its success. 
 
D. APPENDIX OVERVIEW 
The following appendices will be attached to this thesis: 
• Appendix A – Test Cases  – These test cases focused on determining if 
scenarios could be written in which a classified asset could be secured 
using physical or procedural security measures.  Numerous test cases were 
conducted, each of which was designed to determine if the game engine 
performed in an acceptable manner and that SDF could be configured to 
produce outcomes that met expected results. 
• Appendix B – VentureGames Scenario – The VentureGames Scenario is 
the playable game scenario developed for this thesis.  It is composed of 
five individual game modules, each of which builds on lessons learned 
from the previous modules.   
3• Appendix C – VentureGames Scenario Solutions – These SDFs provide a 
winnable solution to each of the VentureGames’ modules. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has identified the focus of this thesis and informed the reader of the 
two basic questions this thesis will attempt to answer.  Additionally, this chapter defines 
the scope of the thesis and identifies, to the reader, what end products are expected upon 
the successful completion of this thesis.  Finally, this chapter provides the reader with an 
outline and brief description, of the contents, of each chapter and appendix contained in 
this thesis.  The following chapters will expound on the topics covered in this chapter and 
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5II.  BACKGROUND 
A. THE NEED FOR INFORMATION ASSURANCE TRAINING 
We live in an amazing time in the annals of human history: the Information Age.  
Recent technology has provided immeasurable advantages over past generations with 
regard to the dissemination, processing, and storage of information, such as global 
communications networks, computers, and the Internet.  This technology has also 
introduced numerous new challenges to the protection of information from unauthorized 
access and modification.  These new challenges must be addressed in order to support 
Information Assurance.  Formally Information Assurance is defined as: 
Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. [CNSS 2003]  
A fundamental step required to protect information, whether it is a nation’s top-
secret nuclear technology or a small business’ accounting data, is to provide training in 
Information Assurance to the users of this information.  Prior to the invention of 
computers, physical security means such as safes, locked filing cabinets, and secured 
rooms were used to protect information.  The development of the first generation of 
digital computers, in the United States following World War II [Britannica], introduced 
new information protection challenges in the areas of unauthorized access and 
modification of protected information.  The explosive growth in users of the Internet, 
estimated to be 1.10 billion by 2005 [ClickZ 2004], and the increased reliance, by both 
corporate and military sectors, on networked computing systems to process, store, and 
disseminate their information have introduced even greater challenges to information 
protection.   
In today’s high technology fast-paced society the ability to instantly and reliably 
access information is so ubiquitous that it has become a necessity, for both personal and 
professional uses, rather than a luxury.   Simply isolating it, either in a safe or secure 
room or on a stand-alone computer system, can no longer solely protect information.  
Information’s value comes from its authorized users’ ability to access it and then process 
it in conjunction with any other information available to those users.  The need to process 
6different information, with different security attributes, simultaneously leads to the 
intermingling of information needs.  Cleared users often need access to low sensitivity 
information at the same time that they need access to highly sensitive information.  Thus 
users may need a single system to store and protect both unclassified and classified 
information.  This requirement introduces several new security concerns such as security 
labels, and access controls.  Additionally, the requirement to access information via a 
network introduces even more challenges to securing information.  To protect 
information from the new vulnerabilities introduced by technological advances, 
numerous protection mechanisms are often employed.  These protection mechanisms can 
be in the form of physical security measures, procedural security measures, and/or 
technical security measures.  This is also where the need for user training comes in.  
Whether by intentional or accidental means, users often pose the greatest threat to 
information assurance today. [Southgate 2002] 
Training and education, however, are troublesome and often difficult 
requirements to meet.  Security is a complex topic that encompasses interrelated concepts 
and mechanisms that must be combined properly to ensure protection for information.  
The models and mathematics behind these topics and concepts are often far beyond the 
grasp of the average user.  Traditional pedogical techniques often fall short of fulfilling 
the security teaching objectives required for today’s information user.  PowerPoint briefs 
and mass email reminders are treated as more of a nuisance than as useful security 
training material.  Long technical seminars and formal classes that describe every nuance 
of security policies and technologies are not appropriate for the average user and are 
often far beyond their comprehension.  So what is the answer? 
What if there was a training tool that would simultaneously educate while it 
entertained the user?  What if this tool could simulate the real world and the issues 
involved in Information Assurance and could be configured so that it could be used in a 
formal classroom setting as well as on a home PC?  What if personalized scenarios could 
be developed that focus on a particular security aspect or need?  What if this tool could 
be scaled so that it could train every level of user, from entry-level personnel to security 
experts?  What if this tool came in the form of “an interactive, entertaining, commercial-
grade PC-based computer game where players construct and defend a networked 
7computing system?” [Cyber 2003]  This is the potential that the CyberCIEGE project 
brings to the security training table. 
 
B. THE CYBERCIEGE VIRTUAL LABORATORY  
The following section provides a synopsis of [Cyber 2003].  The Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research (CISR) has taken on these “what ifs” and begun the development of just such a 
tool. It will address many of the issues previously mentioned concerning Information 
Assurance and network security.  In order to ensure the highest quality product possible, 
CISR has joined forces with Rivermind, a professional game development company.  
Together CISR and Rivermind have developed CyberCIEGE, an Information Assurance 
(IA) teaching/learning laboratory that integrates rigorous scientific foundations with the 
application of abstract principles to the real world. This hands-on virtual laboratory will 
provide a dynamic and surprising context from which abstract principles can be 
discovered and then applied.   By packaging this information assurance laboratory as an 
interactive, entertaining, commercial-grade PC-based computer game, CyberCIEGE will 
be able to package much-needed education/training into an entertaining and user-friendly 
environment.  The players will be able to construct and defend a networked computing 
system by selecting information technology resources to meet the explicit needs of virtual 
"users", and defend the resulting system from numerous threats. 
 
1. Game Play 
Conceptually CyberCIEGE is a resource management video game similar to other 
simulation games currently on the market except that, rather than allowing players to 
choose rides, refreshments and facilities, CyberCIEGE will enable players to create and 
control computer networks, implement security measures, hire and fire IT staff and 
defend the network.  Players will learn through choices they make.  Poor security choices 
will result in unintended results.  To be successful in the game, the player will have to 
identify vulnerabilities, make sound Information Assurance choices, and maintain the 
network’s security.  The entertainment aspect of the game is derived from the interaction 
between the game engine and the player.  Once the player believes that all of the 
8appropriate security measures have been taken and that the information is safe, the game 
engine starts to probe the security defenses chosen by the player until vulnerabilities lead 
to unintended consequences.  The player must then identify and resolve these newly 
discovered vulnerabilities, in order to protect the information, never knowing if any new 
security decision will open even more unforeseen vulnerabilities. 
 
2. Virtual Laboratory 
In addition to being a commercial-grade PC-based video game, CyberCIEGE can 
act as an Information Assurance virtual laboratory.  Establishing a traditional laboratory 
network is not always possible in a training environment.  Financial, spatial, and time 
constraints often restrict the instructor’s ability to provide students with “hands on” 
training which is often critical to true understanding and appreciation for the nuances 
associated with securing complicated network architectures.  As a virtual laboratory, 
instructors will be able to augment classroom instruction with training provided by the 
simulations of the CyberCIEGE game.   The training provided by CyberCIEGE results 
from the game engine’s ability to identify security lapses in policy, procedure, training, or 
execution, and then simulate probable attacks that would occur due to these security 
lapses.  Players will “pay a price” for these security lapses until they identify the problem 
and take appropriate actions to resolve the situation.  The non-deterministic nature of the 
game ensures that repeated executions of the same scenario will result in a variety of 
outcomes.   
Training via a virtual laboratory has several obvious advantages over training on a 
physical laboratory network.  First, the game can be tuned to any level of training needed.  
CyberCIEGE can provide simulations that cover basic concepts, for entry-level students, 
to advanced topics, for advanced technical security experts. Second, the game is 
interactive in that it will provide feedback to the student and the instructor in the form of 
pop-up and banner messages during game play and “log” and “results” files after the 
game is completed.  The “log” and “results” are critical to the training process for they 
provide both the instructor and student with the ability to evaluate the student’s 
performance and to identify those vulnerabilities unmitigated by the student that the game 
engine recognized and took advantage of.  This immediate access to feedback ensures 
9that the errors the student made in establishing security policy or procedure within the 
CyberCIEGE simulation can be both explained to the student and corrected in a timely 
manner. 
 
C. THE NEED FOR CUSTOMIZABLE SCENARIOS 
Traditionally PC-based video games come packaged with a limited number of 
scenarios that a player can choose from.  These scenarios are often played in a fixed 
sequence.  In order to prevent players from becoming disinterested and to capitalize on 
brand loyalty, game developers often offer “expansion packs” to their games.  These 
expansion packs are in essence additional scenarios that the player can add to the original 
configuration in order to extend the playability of the game.  These “expansion packs” 
are also instrumental in introducing new characters, concepts, and capabilities.  However, 
the player has no say in what these improvements to the game will be, when they will be 
offered, or even which game improvements they want to utilize.  What if the scenario 
details could be tailored to meet the player’s specific game preferences or training 
requirements?  
The training advantage provided by the CyberCIEGE game architecture is derived 
from its ability to develop and accept customizable scenarios.  As defined by the 
CyberCIEGE encyclopedia a scenario is “an instance of the CyberCIEGE game in which 
the player is given an initial budget and succeeds by reaching a defined objective.” 
[Rivermind2 2002]  The game is able to run these customized scenarios through the use 
of a SDF.  The SDFs provide both players and instructors with the ability to choose the 
scenario’s startup information.  This startup information includes such things as which 
users to include, what assets are needed, the goals, the win/loss conditions, and numerous 
other choices.  These player-determined choices are what provide the variety, complexity, 
and uniqueness to each of the customized scenarios.  SDFs provide the means through 
which the player can make scenario game play choices and then, in a game-readable 
format, enter those choices into the CyberCIEGE game engine.  This format has been 
developed into a template known as the Scenario File Template (SFT).  As described by 
[Johns 2004] “the SFT is the master document that describes the scenario language and 
how it is to be used to create scenarios.  It specifies the layout of an SDF, in what order 
10
fields are expected to appear, what is optional and what is not.”  A more detailed 
explanation of the SFT is given by [Johns 2004]. 
The scalability provided by this ability to develop customizable game scenarios is 
what makes CyberCIEGE a breakthrough in Information Assurance training.  A single 
CyberCIEGE game engine can be used to train both entry-level Information Assurance 
students and advanced technical security experts.  The game engine can easily be 
configured to simulate fundamental security issues in a step-by-step manner, and then 
simulate highly complex, and often obscure, security concepts.  Focused training on 
specific aspects of Information Assurance and broad overview training can both easily be 
accommodated simply by loading a customized scenario into the game engine. 
 
D.  KEY CONCEPTS 
For the reader to fully understand what is taught in the scenario provided with this 
thesis, some key security concepts must be covered.  This review will provide a basis for 
understanding why certain security decisions were made and the significance of the 
outcome of the game’s execution.  The following definitions for Information Assurance 
and Network Security provide a basis from which the rest of the concepts can expand.  
The National Information Assurance Glossary defines Information Assurance as:   
Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation. These measures include providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities.   [CNSS 2003] 
Additionally computer security is defined as: 
 Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of IS assets including hardware, software, firmware, and 
information being processed, stored and communicated.  [CNSS 2003] 
The concepts in these two definitions overlap.  Key aspects that must be 




1. Security Policy 
A security policy is the foundation for protecting information.  As defined by the 
CyberCIEGE encyclopedia: 
A security policy is a set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an 
enterprise manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
[Rivermind2 2004] 
  Security policies are complex documents that outline the steps and procedures 
required to protect information.  This thesis will focus on the following areas of a security 
policy: 
• Physical Security – Physical security encompasses a wide variety of 
security measures.  These measures range from installing locks on doors to 
hiring guards and installing surveillance cameras.  Physical security also 
includes measures such as developing a contingency plan in case of a 
natural disaster or providing back-up power in case of a power blackout.  
A basic definition of physical security as it relates to computer security is 
“controlling the comings and goings of people and materials; protection 
against the elements and natural disasters.” [Albion 2004] 
• Mandatory Access Control – Typically a management directive that 
identifies the sensitivities of information and the constraints placed on 
people who might have access to the information.  Access is not granted 
based on the discretion of individual users.  These "MAC" policies are 
both global and persistent.  Example uses of MAC policies are protection 
of highly proprietary secrets from potential competitors and ensuring that 
only authorized accountants can alter specific critical financial data.” 
[Rivermind2 2004]   
• Discretionary Access Control – Individual users or groups of users can 
own or otherwise control the access to information and potentially the 
dissemination of rights to grant access to other users.  Access decisions are 
based on the discretion of users (often within the context of management 
mandates intended to constrain a user's decision to grant access based on a 
"need to know"). [Rivermind2 2004]   
There are numerous other security issues and countless details involved in 
developing and implementing a security policy.  The CyberCIEGE encyclopedia, 






Confidentiality is the key aspect of information assurance for this thesis therefore 
a formal definition is provided so that the reader has a basis of understanding.  
Confidentiality is:  
Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities or 
processes. [CNSS 2003]   
The need to protect information from unauthorized access ranges from the 
requirements of nation states all the way down to those of a single individual on a 
personal computer.  This information could be as mundane as secret chicken recipe or as 
sensitive as the technical specifications for construction of a centrifuge to enrich uranium.  
Confidentiality relates to the requirement that these “secrets” are protected.  The focus of 
this thesis is to develop a CyberCIEGE scenario that simulates the confidentiality issues 
involved in protecting classified corporate information within an internal network 
connected to the Internet.  To develop this scenario, several concepts important to 
understanding how the confidentiality of information is protected must be discussed. 
 
3. Integrity 
 Integrity is a key aspect of information assurance and computer security.  
Formally, integrity is defined as:  
The quality of an IS reflecting the logical correctness and reliability of the 
operating system; the logical completeness of the hardware and software 
implementing the protection mechanisms; and the consistency of the data 
structures and occurrence of the stored data. Note that, in a formal security 
mode, integrity is interpreted more narrowly to mean protection against 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information. [CNSS 2003] 
The importance of the integrity of information cannot be overstated, for example 
a small error in a map grid coordinate entered into a cruise missile’s guidance system 
could have catastrophic effects.  The integrity of information can be paramount to the 
success of the user of that information.  However, for this thesis, integrity is not the focus 





The availability of information is a simple concept to grasp, but is difficult to 
achieve.  Availability is formally defined as:  
 The prevention of unauthorized withholding of information or resources. 
[CNSS 2003]   
What availability means, as it relates to information, is that access to the 
information is attainable at a desired time.  The most common term associated with 
availability is Denial of Service (DoS).  DoS is the “type of incident resulting from any 
action or series of actions that prevents any part of an IS from functioning.”  DoS attacks 
are often thought of as being the type conducted by hackers against websites that they 
may disagree with, however, DoS attacks come in many more variations.  Loss of 
electrical power, overloaded bandwidth, and password lockouts are all common examples 
of DoS attacks.  Availability issues are not the focus of the scenario developed for this 
thesis.  The issues involved with availability will be modeled and developed elsewhere 
within the context of the CyberCIEGE project. 
 
5. Networks 
A network is “a group of two or more computer systems linked together.” 
[Webopedia 2004] Networks have many topologies (hub, star, ring, etc.) and sizes (LAN, 
MAN, WAN, etc.) and are used for many purposes (military, corporate, commercial, etc.)   
To keep this thesis to an appropriate scale only two types of networks will be considered.  
The first is an internal network, which is often called an intranet.  Intranets are closed 
networks that belong to an organization and only authorized users can gain access to it.  
The second network considered is the Internet.  The Internet is the largest inter-
networking of computers in the world.  It spans virtually every country and continent and 
is accessible to billions of people each day.  In the past ten years the Internet has become 
so integrated into peoples lives that it has become indispensable in modern society.  
[Hoffman 2004]  The following formal definition of each of these types of networks is 
provided for the reader to establish a basic understanding of the key aspects of each. 
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An intranet is defined as:  
A network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet) belonging to an 
organization, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization's 
members, employees, or others with authorization. An intranet's Web sites 
look and act just like any other Web sites, but the firewall surrounding an 
intranet fends off unauthorized access. [Webopedia 2004] 
The Internet is defined as: 
A global network connecting millions of computers. More than 100 
countries are linked into exchanges of data, news and opinions.  Unlike 
online services, which are centrally controlled, the Internet is 
decentralized by design. Each Internet computer, called a host, is 
independent. Its operators can choose which Internet services to use and 
which local services to make available to the global Internet community. 
Remarkably, this anarchy by design works exceedingly well.  There are a 
variety of ways to access the Internet. Most online services, such as 
America Online, offer access to some Internet services. It is also possible 
to gain access through a commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP). The 
Internet is not synonymous with World Wide Web. [Webopedia 2004] 
Networks have been an instrumental part of the technological revolution that has 
brought about an age of information.  Today information has become the most valuable 
and sought after commodity in the world.  Those who have it, or can get it, often have an 
insurmountable advantage over those who do not.  This is true in both the commercial 
and military sectors.  Thus, the need to protect information from unauthorized access has 
become of paramount importance to those who covet it. 
 
6. Components 
To facilitate the confidentiality of classified information numerous components 
have been created that play a role in ensuring the confidentiality of protected information.  
These components, workstations, servers, routers, and firewalls, are often the key nodes 
in both corporate and military information infrastructures and thus are often points of 
vulnerability.  A brief definition of each of the key components required for this thesis is 
provided to provide a basis of understanding for the reader. 
Workstation - A workstation is equivalent to a modern day personal computer.  
They are the backbone of today’s corporate and military work environment.  
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Workstations can store assets locally, i.e. on the workstation itself, or they can be used to 
access assets that are stored on other components connected to the workstation via 
networks. [Rivermind2 2004] 
Server - Servers are the worker bees of a network.  They contain and often 
provide much of the information that people are interested in.  A server is primarily used 
to store assets and host application programs (e.g., resource management programs).  At a 
minimum, servers can be used to store and share assets.  Servers can include specific 
applications that provide the functions of other components, e.g., a server with an e-mail 
application looks like an e-mail server. [Rivermind2 2004] 
Router – Routers link local networks with remote networks. Routers provide a 
means of interconnecting multiple distinct networks that are potentially of different 
physical types (e.g., connect LANs with wide area networks such as the Internet). 
 Routers include one or more "internal" networks and one "external" network connection. 
 External connections can only be interconnected to other router external connections. 
Routers include filters such that traffic flow between the networks is constrained based 
on the type of the destination application.   For example, a router can permit or deny Web 
access requests (HTTP) flowing to the external network from the internal network or 
flowing from the external network form the internal network. [Rivermind2 2004]   
Firewall – Firewalls are network security devices designed to logically separate 
physically connected networks, such as separating an intranet from the Internet.  In 
corporate networks firewalls provide a means of interconnecting the "internal" corporate 
network to an "external" network such as the Internet.  To facilitate this separation 
firewalls include filters such that traffic flow between the networks is constrained based 
on the kind of application to which the traffic is destined.   For example, a firewall can 
permit or deny Web access requests (HTTP) flowing to external network from the 
internal network and/or flowing from the external network from the internal network. 






This chapter has provided the reader with background information detailing the 
need for Information Assurance (IA) training in both corporate and military computing 
environments.  Second, this chapter has provided the reader with a description and 
explanation of both the purpose and goal of the CyberCIEGE project.  Third, this chapter 
has informed the reader of the importance of the ability of the CyberCIEGE game to 
accept and execute customizable game scenarios.  These customized game scenarios 
facilitate individualized and focused IA training, at minimum cost in both money and 
time.  Finally, this chapter has provided the reader with both explanations and definitions 
of some key concepts, such as confidentiality, and aspects of network topologies, of 
Information Assurance and network security necessary for understanding subsequent 
chapters in this thesis.  Additional details concerning these notions, as well as issues 





III. SCENARIO GOALS 
A. INTENDED USERS 
In general, the intended users for the CyberCIEGE game are DoD employees, 
both civilian and military personnel.  The DoD has an immense requirement to provide 
information confidentiality and network security due to the nature of information it deals 
with on a daily basis.  In order to protect this information the DoD spends millions of 
dollars annually on systems, software, procedures, and equipment that are designed to 
meet these requirements.   But even the most secure system has some vulnerability and 
more often than not it is the personnel themselves whose behavior can introduce 
vulnerabilities.  The concepts and procedures involved with ensuring the confidentiality 
of information are very complex and often cumbersome.  The requirement to train 
personnel in these concepts and procedures is a daunting task.  The DoD directly employs 
over 2 million personnel [DIOR 2004] and works with millions more in the form of 
contractors, researchers, advisors, and consultants.  All of these people require 
Information Assurance (IA) training. However, they often require different levels and 
aspects of this training because people often possess different degrees of inherent 
knowledge and previous training experience.  These differences must be taken into 
account when developing an IA training program.  If the training is too difficult the 
students will not grasp the concepts being taught making the training useless and a waste 
of valuable time.  Additionally, if the training is below the students level of inherent 
knowledge the student will become bored and uninterested and once again the training 
evolution becomes a waste of time.  
The ability to customize training to an individual person’s needs has, to this point, 
been both economically and logistically impossible, especially for an organization the 
size of the DoD.  The CyberCIEGE game addresses this need and provides a means for 
conducting individualized training so that it is cost efficient, timely, and entertaining.  
The CyberCIEGE game allows for training to be conducted by anyone, anytime, and 
anywhere that they can access a personal computer.  With CyberCIEGE training would 
no longer have to interrupt personnel schedules and work days; it can simply be 
completed while personnel are conducting their everyday routines.  Additionally training 
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can be completed while students are at home, on temporary additional duty, or while 
traveling. 
The specific intended users of the CyberCIEGE game and associated scenario 
definition files are the instructors that are required to provide training and the players 
who are required to receive the training.   
 
1. Instructor 
CyberCIEGE Virtual Laboratory instructors come in many forms.  They can be 
traditional instructors who conduct training in formal school environments or they can be 
system administrators who manage small office networks.  In either case they are the 
ones charged with providing Information Assurance training to their users.  CyberCIEGE 
provides them with a scalable, customizable, and entertaining way of conducting this 
training, whether required or voluntary. 
The key aspect of the CyberCIEGE game for instructors is the ability to produce 
customized Scenario Definition Files (SDF).  These customized SDFs provide instructors 
with the ability to develop training scenarios that focus on topics and concepts that an 
individual student may require and to provide this training in an entertaining and 
educational environment.  Additionally, the random nature of the game allows for 
numerous outcomes from the same scenario.  For example a confidential asset may be 
protected from an external attack in one execution of the scenario while the same 
confidential asset may be compromised by an internal attack in a subsequent execution of 
the game.  This aspect of the game provides the instructor with a tool that demonstrates 
the random nature of the types of attacks the player must contend with.   
 
2. Player 
The targeted player of the CyberCIEGE game is anyone requiring access to a 
DoD computer or network.   Players can be organized into several groups.  These groups 
include: 
• New personnel with little or no initial training in computer security  
• Transferred personnel who have some security awareness training  
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• Current personnel requiring annual refresher training 
• Information Technology personnel requiring continuing education 
• Personnel requiring training in order to regain suspended network 
privileges 
• Personnel attending formal schools  
 
The benefit CyberCIEGE brings to the training table for the players is that the 
games can be tailored to the player’s skill levels and training requirements.  They can 
play the game wherever and whenever they have access to a personal computer, thus 
avoiding daylong training seminars. 
 
B. EDUCATIONAL GOALS 
The goal of this thesis is to provide a SDF that is simultaneously a playable game 
and an educational tool that illustrates some specific concepts associated with 
information confidentiality.  For this thesis, the scenario being developed is focused on 
providing training for inexperienced or entry-level personnel; therefore, a sequential, 
modular approach to game development was taken.  Additionally, due to the vast array of 
topics associated with the confidentiality of information, three specific issues will be 
focused on in this thesis.  The confidentiality issues covered in this thesis encompass 
those issues involved with providing physical security for information, and establishing 
internal network connections (i.e. Intranet), and external network (i.e. Internet) 
connections to access information.  The scenario developed for this thesis will provide 
training in these topics by utilizing modules that incrementally introduce these issues as 
requirements for successfully completing the game.  Player education will occur through 
sequentially increasing the requirements the player must satisfy in order to successfully 
complete the scenario. It is expected that the player will initially fail at meeting the 
requirements for successfully completing the game.  As the player gains experience, 
through multiple game executions, and begins to comprehend, from instructor and game 
feedback, he will begin to master the fundamentals of confidentiality and appreciate the 
potential vulnerabilities introduced by his decisions. 
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1. Physical Security 
Before discussing the aspects of physically security a definition must be provided as a 
basis for common understanding.  In the context of this thesis Physical Security is: 
The application of physical barriers and control procedures to protect 
information and information systems. [ITSecurity 2004] 
Providing physical security measures such as locks, safes, and guards is a 
fundamental requirement for protecting information.  Some of these physical security 
measures, such as posting a guard, have been around for centuries, while more modern 
physical security measures, such as biometric authentication, have only recently been 
commercially available.  Highly valued objects (e.g. cash, gold, information, etc…) have 
always required physical protection as a first line of defense and as the value of these 
objects to potential attackers rises, the amount of physical security required must rise as 
well.  Fort Knox, home of the national gold reserve requires substantially more physical 
security than does the answer key to an exam.   Thus physical security is essential to the 
success of any security plan, regardless of the object’s relative value.   
Physical security encompasses a range of measures that can be taken to protect 
information.  These measure range from the extremely low tech mechanisms, such as 
locking valuable objects in a safe, to extremely high tech measures, such as requiring 
biometric authentication in order to gain access to an object.  A minor oversight in 
physical security could be the Achilles heel of even the most elaborate and advanced high 
tech protection system.  As Mies van der Rohe2 once said, “the devil is in the details” and 
when it comes to security this is definitely true. 
While physical security measures most often form the foundation upon which all 
other security measure can be built, they alone are not enough to protect objects.  There is 
often a point at which the perceived value of the object is so high that physical security 
alone cannot protect the object.  An example of this occurred in February 2003 when the 
Antwerp (Belgium) Diamond Centre was the site of the largest diamond heist in history.  
The robbers made off with an estimated $100 million in diamonds and left no clues as to 
how they did it.   
                                                 
2 Mies van der Rohe is the German born American Architect (1886 –1969) most often attributed with 
this quote.  
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The Diamond Centre at the heart of Antwerp's historic gem district has 
surveillance cameras everywhere and requires special passes to get in. The 
room where all the vaults are is even better protected, with round-the-
clock guards standing by.  [CNN 2003]  
This elaborate, layered, and very expensive defense of the diamond vaults was 
overcome by a group of very determined and highly motivated thieves who had both the 
intelligence and patience required to identify the vulnerabilities in the physical security in 
place and exploit them.   
Providing a basic understanding of the requirements and challenges associated 
with physical security is one of the main educational goals of this thesis.  The scenario 
being developed will require that the player evaluate the physical security requirements 
needed to protect objects of differing values to attackers and then establish those 
measures deemed necessary to protect those objects from unauthorized access and theft.  
As a result the player will develop an understanding of the importance in establishing an 
appropriate level of physical security for ensuring the confidentiality of information. 
 
2. Intranet 
Intranets are essential for both commercial and military operations therefore a 
definition is provided to provide the reader with a basis of understanding.  As defined 
earlier, an intranet is  
A network based on TCP/IP protocols (an internet) belonging to an 
organization, usually a corporation, accessible only by the organization's 
members, employees, or others with authorization. [Webopedia 2004]  
In the scenario developed for this thesis the intranet is the first network 
connection the player must deal with.  Intranets are essential in today’s commercial and 
military environment.  They provide a high-speed, low cost means of communication 
amongst employees, they can provide a path for accessing an object (i.e. files, software, 
programs, etc…) located on a server or other storage medium, and they can provide an 
efficient means of providing information and guidance through the use of an intranet 
based web site.   
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A key aspect of an intranet is its separation from other networks.  This separation 
can be either physical or logical.  A physically separate intranet ensures that no external 
network access can be gained to the network.  This provides for strong network security 
however it does not prevent internal attacks.  Additionally, physical separation not only 
prevents outsiders from coming in, it also prevents insiders from getting out.  While this 
may be acceptable in some highly secure military networks it is often not acceptable for 
commercial and routine military purposes.  Therefore, the need for internal users to gain 
access to some external network requires that the intranet be logically separated by some 
technological means, such as a firewall.  Firewalls are primarily used to logically separate 
an intranet from an external network.  Firewalls can be configured to allow access by 
internal users out and to block external users from gaining internal access.  This ability to 
physically connect an intranet to an external network while simultaneously keeping it 
logically separate is essential for contemporary business activities.  
The scenario developed for this thesis requires the player to make decisions 
concerning which virtual users need access to the intranet and which do not.  Players will 
also have to decide which assets (information) need to be accessible via an intranet.   The 
basic security concept that this scenario demonstrates is that a connection to a network, 
even an internal network, may produce immediate and catastrophic vulnerabilities to 
valuable assets.  To win this scenario the player will need to recognize the potential 
solutions and weigh the benefits and consequences of each in order to meet the virtual 
users’ goals and complete the scenario.  
  
3. Internet 
The Internet is the largest interconnection of computers in the world.  It spans the 
globe and can be accessed from virtually anywhere on the planet.  It provides instant 
access to incalculable amounts of information and can be accessed by anyone with a 
networked device of some sort.  As reported by the Computer Industry Almanac the 
estimated number of Internet users in 2004 is 945 million and expected to rise to 1.46 
billion by 2007. [ClickZ 2004] 
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The ubiquitous and user-friendly nature of the Internet has revolutionized the 
concept of access to information.  Business decisions and military planning alike are 
inextricably reliant upon instant and accurate access to information.  Leaders, decision 
makers, and ordinary people no longer consider instant, reliable access to information as 
a luxury; they now consider it a necessity.  This creates a dilemma when planning a 
security policy for protecting information.  Decisions must be made that both protect 
information from unauthorized access while simultaneously providing access for 
authorized users via the Internet.  While a highly secure military facility may be able to 
function in complete isolation, this is not true for today’s commercial, and increasingly 
for today’s military, endeavors. Thus connecting to the Internet is a double-edged sword 
that requires consideration of both its, risks and benefits.  
In addition to granting internal users access to the Internet, access by external 
users must be considered.  There are numerous situations where a remote user may 
require access, via the Internet, to an intranet.  These situations include users on business 
travel who require access to a company-maintained database, students who need access to 
their school’s intranet in order to complete assignments, or customers who require access 
to internal company networks to conduct business (e.g. Internet based bank account 
management).   
In the scenario developed for this thesis, the player will be required to provide the 
virtual users in the game access to the Internet.  In addition, there is a requirement to 
grant remote users access to a company-controlled web server.  These requirements are 
intended to familiarize the player with some of the basic security issues and decisions 
necessary to fulfill user requirements for access to information while simultaneously 
protecting that information from unauthorized access.  There are numerous decisions that 
the player will be able to make to meet these requirements, each of which has benefits 
and detriments.  The primary educational goal is to illustrate to the player the importance 
of network configuration to the security of classified information and that there are often 






This chapter has provided the reader with an understanding of who the intended 
users, of the CyberCIEGE game, are and why.  It also informs the reader of the 
differences between the roles (instructor or player) the game’s intended users might 
fulfill.  Finally, this chapter identifies and justifies the intended educational goals of the 
CyberCIEGE scenario that has been developed for this thesis.  The following chapter will 
describe and provide details concerning the CyberCIEGE game that has been developed 
for this thesis. 
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IV.  SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
This scenario was developed to answer the first question posed in this thesis, can 
a CyberCIEGE scenario be developed such that it is simultaneously a playable game and 
an educational tool that illustrates confidentiality issues in an internal corporate network 
connected to the Internet?  To accomplish this the scenario was written to meet the 
educational goals delineated earlier in this thesis.  This chapter will describe the scenario 
in detail and identify how each aspect of the scenario correlates to the educational goals 
identified earlier.  Finally, since the security concepts being taught are fundamental to 
any Information Assurance program, the scenario written for this thesis is based in a 
corporate environment, however many of the lessons learned in it can translate directly to 
a military environment. 
  The scenario simulates the plight of VentureGames (VG).  To begin business 
operations VG has acquired a small office building where it can set up its corporate 
offices.  The offices are empty and no equipment or networks currently exist.  Quickly 
establishing a functional office is paramount to the success of this scenario. 
VG is in a very competitive industry and thus must protect their proprietary work 
and intellectual property.  To conduct daily business the company needs a private internal 
network (Intranet) as well as connection to the Internet.  Employees use the VG intranet 
to communicate with each other and to access databases and servers that contain 
information they require to meet their goals.  The Internet is for external communications 
and research purposes.  VG employee’s happiness and productivity will be affected, both 
positively and negatively, by the ease at which they can meet their goals. 
Although VentureGames is only a startup computer gaming company it is in the 
process of developing a Next Generation (NG) video game.  This NG game is the most 
valuable asset that the company owns.  Its successful development and production will 
make VentureGames a major player in the computer gaming industry.   This NG game is 
so revolutionary that VentureGames’ competition is determined to get a copy of it; 
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additionally the gamer community has gotten wind of the NG game and is very active in 
trying to obtain a pirated copy of it from the Internet. 
The goal of the player will be to provide the components necessary for the 
company to establish both an internal network and a connection to the Internet so that the 
company employees can meet their goals.  Ensuring the confidentiality of the company’s 
classified information is the key to success in the scenario.  However, establishing overly 
intrusive security measures will negatively affect the employee’s productivity and 
happiness.  Conversely, insufficient application of security measures will create 
vulnerabilities that potential attackers may take advantage of to compromise the 
classified information, which will have a catastrophic effect on the company’s ability to 
operate.   
The player will assume the role of VentureGames’ new Information Technology 
Manager.  The player will be provided with a budget and will be given one month to 
identify the requirements, purchase the components, and provide the connectivity that is 
required for the virtual users to meet their goals.   If after one month the player has not 
been able to make a profit for the company, lost all his money, or if the NG Game Code 
is compromised, the player will lose.  If the player instead makes choices that both 
provide protection for the NG game and enable the virtual users to meet their goals the 
player will win.   
To accomplish the educational goals identified, the VentureGames’ Scenario is 
played in five sequential modules each of which builds upon lessons learned in the 
previous module.  The first module introduces the concept of physical security.  To win 
this module, the player simply needs to provide adequate physical security to protect 
VentureGames’ assets.  Module Two introduces the need for an intranet in the company.  
The key to success in this module is to provide adequate physical security and to properly 
identify which virtual users require access to the intranet and which do not.  The third 
module takes the intranet to the next level by requiring the player to provide intranet 
access to the virtual user who maintains the NG game code (VentureGames’ most 
valuable asset).  The key to success in this module is to provide sufficient physical 
security and then to choose between one of two acceptable means of providing the 
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required access.  Either providing the virtual user with a separate component to gain 
access to the intranet or to physically connect the virtual user to the intranet but to 
logically separate them by using a firewall are satisfactory solutions.  Both of these 
configurations have advantages and disadvantages that must be accounted for but each is 
winnable if the correct choices are made. The fourth module introduces the requirement 
of connecting to the Internet.  One of the virtual users has a new goal of accessing a 
database located at a remote site.  Once again, providing sufficient physical security and 
choosing one of two potentially successful network configurations will determine the 
player’s success or failure.  Finally the fifth module encompasses the concepts identified 
in the previous four and adds the requirement of an external virtual user gaining access to 
an internal VentureGames’ component.  This module is the capstone for this scenario; if 
the player learned the lessons from the previous module and applies them appropriately 
they will have successfully completed the VentureGames’ CyberCIEGE scenario. 
    
B. NARRATIVE 
The narrative is provided as a means for explaining the goals and requirements of 
the player in the game.  The narrative includes a briefing that welcomes the player to the 
game and a short description of the virtual users, their goals and the assets involved in the 
game.  Additionally the parameters for success or failure are provided so that the player 
has a clear idea of what is needed to win the game.  Finally, the narrative contains Game 
Notes, which can aid the player in making decisions, guide him through the scenario, and 
identify where he can look for help.   
For this thesis, only the briefing for the final VentureGames’ module (module 5) 
will be included, all other briefings are a subset of this briefing and therefore will be 
included in their modules’ SDF as the appendices to this thesis.  The following is the 
narrative provided in the fifth VentureGames’ module: 
Welcome to VentureGames!  You have just landed your first big time IT job! It is 
with a small computer game development company called VentureGames (VG).  
VentureGames has just opened shop and you have been hired to set up and protect its IT 
infrastructure.  The company has very little financial backing and minimal market share, 
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but they do have income from several successful games and the plans for a “Next 
Generation” game that, if successful, will catapult the company into the big time!  
Your job is to design and maintain the company network, keeping the staff happy 
and productive while simultaneously ensuring the protection of the company's data.  
Good Luck!   (See the "Game" tab for additional help) 
Module five is an advanced game scenario.  It is designed to challenge the player 
by demonstrating the difficulties associated with connecting an internal network to the 
Internet. This will illustrate some of the difficulties associated with granting external 
access to an internal network while protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information. 
In this scenario there are five employees (users) that you need to help, Bob, Sally, 
Mark, Carl, and Paul.  Additionally there are six assets that you need to protect: 
Employee Files, E-Mail, Marketing Plans, Legacy Code, NG Game Code, and the VG 
Web Site.  Finally, there is an external user (customer) who wants access to a 
VentureGames’ web site where he can gain information about the company and its 
games. 
Bob is the founder and CEO of VentureGames (VG).  Bob needs to access the 
employee files. These files are where Bob maintains the employees’ records and 
evaluations.  The records contain both employee personal and financial information, 
while the evaluations are used to determine which employees get raises, bonuses, 
advancement, and potentially dismissal.  The information in these files is considered 
sensitive (VG PROPRIETARY) since its unauthorized disclosure could cause internal 
discord among employees. 
Paul is the lead programmer at VG.  He is in charge of developing the NG game 
code.  Paul needs access to the NG game code.  The code has the highest company 
classification (SIERRA) because its unauthorized disclosure could result in the financial 
ruin of the company.  VentureGames’ competitors would love to get their hands on this 
new code!  Paul would like to limit access to the NG game code during its development. 
Carl is a VG programmer.  He is responsible for maintaining all of the legacy 
games owned by VG.  These games, while not revolutionary, represent the primary 
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source of income for the company.  Carl's primary mission is to keep the legacy game's 
customers happy by providing updates, fixing bugs, and providing expansion packs in an 
effort to extend the lifespan of these games.  Since Carl has limited game development 
experience and is relatively new to the company he has not been granted access to the 
NG game code. 
Mark is the company secretary.  He answers the phones and greets visitors.  His 
primary job is to maintain the employee files.  He is responsible for the actual updating, 
recording, and maintenance of these files.  He works directly for Bob but interacts with 
all VG employees.  He has no technical computer experience and no comprehension of 
Information Assurance or Network Security.  
Sally is the VP of Marketing for VentureGames.  She is in charge of marketing all 
the VG games.  Her current focus is on developing consumer demand for the NG game 
currently in development.  Sally is a great marketing person, however she is not very 
computer savvy and often consumes a great deal of the IT department's time with routine 
and mundane problems that she can not fix.  Sally’s main goal is to develop the 
Marketing Plan for the NG game.  This marketing plan contains VG PROPRIETARY 
information that if disclosed could be detrimental to the success of the company. 
This scenario introduces the concept of an outside user needing access to the VG-
internal network.  In this scenario the customer wants to access the company’s web site 
to gather information about the games provided by the company. You will need to 
provide this service for the customer when requested. 
The assets that you need to provide access to and protect are the NG Game Code, 
Employee Files, E-MAIL, Marketing Plans and Legacy Code.   
The NG Game Code is the MOST important asset the company owns and is 
therefore classified SIERRA.  It has a very high value (300) to potential attackers.   The 
value of this asset must be kept in mind when establishing security policies, access rights 
and network connectivity. 
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The Employee Files contain sensitive information that only the company 
management should see and are classified as VG PROPRIETARY.   Keep this in mind 
when establishing security policies, access rights and network connectivity. 
The E-MAIL is the primary means of communications amongst employees.  
Without it your company productivity will take a major hit.  E-MAIL is classified NON-
SENSITIVE. 
The Marketing Plans are for the NG Game Code.  They contain information 
concerning what the new game is and how it functions.  This plans are classified VG 
PROPRIETARY and must be protected from external disclosure. 
The Legacy Code consists of all the games that VentureGames currently offers 
and are classified as VG PROPRETARY.  These games are relatively popular and 
provide the bulk of the company's income.  These valuable assets must be protected in 
order to maintain this constant income flow. 
There are three clearance levels in this scenario: SIERRA, VG PROPRIETARY, 
and NON-SENSITIVE.   
SIERRA is the highest classification at VentureGames.  It is reserved for use on 
only the most valuable of information.  Disclosure of SIERRA classified information 
poses an extreme risk to the financial success and continued operation of the company.  
Employees are required to have a HIGH background check prior to receiving a SIERRA 
clearance. 
VG PROPRIETARY classification is reserved for information that, if disclosed, 
could pose a serious risk to the financial success and continued operation of the 
company.  A MEDIUM level background check is required for an employee to receive a 
VG PROPRIETARY clearance. 
NON-SENSITIVE classification includes all publicly releasable data.  This 
information poses no risk to the company.  There is no background check required for a 
NON-SENSITIVE clearance. 
To win this game, you must make a profit for the company.  To do this, you will 
need to provide the IT support necessary for the users to reach their goals and the 
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security measures necessary to protect classified assets.  If the NG Game Code is 
compromised by your competitors (an external attacker) you will immediately lose!  
Internal disclosures and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, both external and self-imposed, 
will result in financial loss.  
GOOD LUCK!! 
GAME NOTE:  Set up your IT infrastructure prior to going operational (i.e. 
UNPAUASE). 
GAME NOTE:  Get familiar with the users, their goals, the assets, and the zones in the 
game prior to going operational (i.e. UNPAUSE). 
GAME NOTE:  Check the access list for each zone and component to ensure that the 
Principle of Least Privilege is enforced. 
GAME NOTE:  Hit the "e" key to access the game's encyclopedia. 
 
C.  ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES 
There are two types of Access Control Policies that will be used in the 
VentureGames’ scenario.  These two policies are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC).   A formal definition of each is provided to aid the 
reader in understanding what each of these access control policies means and its 
implications to the game. 
A Mandatory Access Control Policy is formally defined as a: 
 Means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity of the 
information contained and the formal authorizations (i.e., clearance, 
formal access, approvals, and need-to-know) of subjects to access 
information of such sensitivity. [CNSS 2003]   
A Discretionary Access Control policy is formally defined as a: 
Means of restricting access to objects based on the identity and need-to-
know of users and/or groups to which the object belongs.  Controls are 
discretionary in the sense that a subject with certain access permission is 
capable of passing that permission (directly or indirectly) to any other 
subject. [CNSS 2003]   
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 The key difference in these two access control policies is that in a DAC policy 
subjects (users, programs) can change the access permissions to objects while in a MAC 
policy subjects cannot change these permissions.  In a MAC enforcing system the policy 
is enforced by the system and can only be changed by an administrator in a DAC system 
the users can change the access policies as they please.  
VentureGames has established the following access control policies.  These 
policies are key aspects to the game.  They provide both the motivation for the player to 
protect the assets and for the attackers to gain access to them.   The mandatory policies 
are enforced by the game’s components while the discretionary policies can be 
established or changed by the player during the course of the game. 
 
1. Mandatory Policies 
The following classifications are currently in effect at VentureGames.  All of the 
VentureGames’ assets have been assigned one of these classifications to create a value 
for that asset which the player must protect and an attacker is motivated to obtain.  The 
game engine will enforce the Mandatory Access Control policy to enforce the protection 
of assets having these classifications.  For example, the player will not be able to access 
or create an asset with SIERRA classification on a system that is only authorized to hold 
up to VG PROPRIETARY. 
 
SIERRA - This is the highest classification at VentureGames.  It is limited to use 
on assets that, if they were to be compromised, would financially ruin the company.  
Users must have a high background check to receive this clearance. 
VentureGames is currently in the developmental stages of a “Next Generation” 
video game.  This NG game, if successfully launched, will dominate the industry and 
establish VentureGames as a major player in the gaming industry.  The game, and the 
information concerning it, is the most valuable assets owned by the company.  The NG 
game is an advanced, 3-D, first person, networked action/adventure game.  The graphics, 
sounds, and animations are revolutionary in their design and implementation and its 
cross-platform capability will make it executable on every flavor of gaming system.  If 
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information regarding the specifications, concepts, algorithms, or high-level design 
details of this game are compromised VentureGames’ future prospects as a company will 
be devastated.  VentureGames’ competitors already hold significant financial, 
production, development, and marketing advantages over them.  If they obtained this 
information without having to incur the considerable expense required to resolve the 
technical issues associated with this “Next Generation” technology they would easily 
overcome VentureGames in the development of this new type of game.  Only users 
cleared to SIERRA should have access to this data.   
This clearance has a secrecy value of 5000 and has an attacker value of 300.  
Disclosure of this information poses an extreme risk to the financial success and 
continued operation of the company. 
 
VG PROPRIETARY - This classification is reserved for use on assets that 
require protection but whose compromise, while still serious, would not be devastating to 
the company.  Users must possess a medium level background check to receive this 
clearance. 
The NG game’s high level marketing plans and concepts as well as their ongoing 
developmental status is information that would cause serious damage to VentureGames’ 
if known by its competitors.  In addition the company needs to protect its legacy game 
software and detailed designs.  Only users having a VG PROPRIETARY clearance 
should have access to this data.   
Users having SIERRA clearance implicitly are cleared to access this data. This clearance 
has a secrecy value of 500 and has an attacker value of 50. Disclosure of this information 
poses a serious risk to the financial success and continued operation of the company.  
 
NON-SENSITIVE – This is the lowest classification at VentureGames.  Users do 
not require a background check to receive this clearance. 
This is publicly available information such as released marketing material, 
corporate information, and other openly published information.  This clearance has a 
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secrecy value of 0 and an attacker value of 0.  Disclosure of this type of information 
poses no risk to the company. 
 
2.  Discretionary Policies   
The following discretionary access groups have been established for the 
VentureGames’ scenario to enhance the game’s playability and entertainment value.  By 
introducing interests, among the VentureGames’ employees, that conflict with the 
security policies established in the game, the player is introduced to some of the 
challenges in enforcing such policies.   
 
 PROGRAMMERS - The members of this group are the programmers who 
develop and maintain the games (NG game as well as legacy games).  This DAC group 
has been created to keep non- programmers from accessing the code, legacy and NG.     
The programmers have been hearing rumors that once the NG game is completed 
and ready for distribution the company is going to end support for the legacy games and 
layoff some programmers.  Some of the programmers have been intentionally falling 
behind schedule and/or sabotaging the development of the NG game in order to keep 
their jobs.  The programmers are trying to keep management from finding out how far 
behind schedule the programmers are. 
 
 MANAGEMENT - These group members encompass the management staff of 
the company.  They make the decisions that guide the company.  They have final say in 
the development, design, production, and marketing of the games.  They are also 
responsible for securing the necessary finances needed to fund the company’s operation, 
research, and development.  Management created this DAC group to keep sensitive 
managerial information protected from internal users gaining unauthorized access.   
It is imperative that management prevents the rest of the company’s employees 
from finding out that VentureGames is in serious financial trouble.  The existence of the 
company is intertwined with the successful and on time release of the NG game.  Any 
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delays in its development or release will be financially devastating to the company.  In 
addition management has decided to end support of the legacy games once the NG game 
is launched, therefore they have developed a plan to layoff some employees.  
Management must ensure that no unauthorized personnel ever see this plan. 
 
COMPANY – Everyone who works for VentureGames and requires access to 
components or the network is in this group.  This group includes the IT staff and other 
everyday employees.  Being a member of the company group differentiates employees of 
the company from the general public.  VentureGames’ facility has many valuable assets 
in it, both physical and intellectual, and these assets must be protected.  Access by non-
company personnel should be limited to the absolute minimum. 
 
PUBLIC – By default, all users in the CyberCIEGE game belong to the PUBLIC 
group.  This group also contains VentureGames’ competition, and both script kiddies and 
hackers residing on the Internet that want to gain access to or modify VentureGames’ 
assets.  Access to VentureGames’ assets by the public must be limited to the VG Web Site 
to prevent unauthorized access to classified information. 
 
D. ASSETS 
Assets are an essential element to the game.  They are what the virtual users need, 
or want to gain access to, in order to be productive and happy in the game.  These assets 
are conceptual in nature in that they must first be instantiated on a component for the 
virtual users to reach their asset goals.  Figuring out how to provide the virtual users 
access to their assets while simultaneously preventing any unauthorized access to these 
assets is the fundamental educational goal in this scenario.     
Assets can come in the form of intellectual property, such as game code, or in 
physical form, such as a database.  Additionally the assets have varying degrees of value 
to the enterprise.  Some may be extremely valuable while others are not valuable at all.  
The value of an asset may be due to its classification (e.g. SIERRA, MANAGEMENT) 
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or it may be due to its integrity (integrity is not the focus of this scenario).  Either way 
these assets must be protected from attacks.  
Each asset has a varying degree of value to an attacker.  The higher the asset’s 
attacker value or motivation (ranging from 0 to 1000) the more likely it is to be 
compromised.  Each asset has two values that determine its value or motivation to a 
potential attacker.  The first is determined by the attacker value identified in the MAC 
clearance assigned to the asset.  The second is determined by the attacker motivation to 
break the DAC policy assigned to the asset.  These two distinct attacker-motivating 
values provide the impetuous for both internal and external attacks against a classified 
asset.  By adjusting these values the scenario developer can introduce game intrigue, 
complexity, and realistic simulated game play.  Additionally the scenario developer can 
adjust these values to tune the scenario to an appropriate difficulty level for the intended 
player thus providing tailored training to the player. 
    The following table delineates the relationship between the numerical attacker 





Degree of attacker motivation/skill 
0 No value to an attacker.  No protective measures required. 
25 Valuable to amateur hackers (script kiddies) with interest in low-level 
vandalism.  Requires limited protective measures. 
50 Valuable to hackers with moderate interest in gaining access or 
vandalizing and who have advanced skills.  Requires robust 
protective measures 
100 Valuable to Crackers (professional hackers) with financial interests 
and extensive expertise in gaining access. Requires extensive, layered 
protective measures. 
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1000 Nation state with national interests and unlimited resources to gain 
access.  Virtually impossible to protect against. 
Table 1. Attacker Values 
  
To successfully complete the scenario the player must identify the appropriate 
level of security required to protect each asset while simultaneously providing an 
appropriate means of access to each asset for the virtual users.  This balancing act, 
security versus access, which the player must perform, is a key concept in the protection 
of classified information being demonstrated by the VentureGames’ scenario.    
The following assets are included in the VentureGames’ CyberCIEGE scenario: 
 
 Next Generation Game Code - This is the Next Generation (NG) game code.  Its 
successful development is critical to the financial success of the company.  The 
company's competitors and computer game enthusiasts are both interested in gaining 
access to this code.   
This is the most valuable asset the company owns and is therefore classified 
SIERRA.  Its successful development is critical to the company’s ability to operate in the 
future; any unauthorized access or delays in production will have a catastrophic effect on 
the company.  In addition to requiring protection form external unauthorized access, this 
asset must be protected from internal unauthorized access.   
The development of this game code is very far behind schedule.  The user 
responsible for its development wants to ensure that no one finds out how far behind he is 
on the code.  Therefore only he should have access to this asset. 
 
Legacy Code - The Legacy Code includes all the games that VentureGames 
currently owns and maintains.  These games are moderately popular and are currently 
the sole source of income for the company. 
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While these games are currently on the market their actual game code still 
requires protection and is therefore classified VG PROPRIETARY.  Game enthusiasts, 
script kiddies, and hackers alike continually attempt to steal this asset in attempt to get 
the games for free.  Compromise of this asset will result in financial difficulties for the 
company.   
The programmers have spent countless hours on the development of the VG game 
library.  They would prefer that the bare minimum number of people, to include 
management, be able to gain access to the code.  
 
Marketing Plans - These are the Marketing Plans for the NG game.  They contain 
proprietary information concerning the game and its revolutionary "game play".   
The marketing plans contain details concerning the NG game and its 
revolutionary game play, as well as all of VentureGames’ market and research data that 
has been collected to develop an advertising campaign to garner interest in the NG 
game.  Since VentureGames’ competitors are interested in gaining advanced copies of 
these plans, this asset is classified VG PROPRIETARY. 
Management wants to limit access to the marketing plans until the NG game is 
ready for release.  The marketing plans contain information that, if compromised, could 
provide an undue advantage to the competition, which will cause serious financial 
damage to the company.   
 
Employee Files - These are the files that contain the VentureGames’ employee 
information.  This information includes sensitive personal and financial information as 
well as classified employee evaluations, promotion lists, and layoff schedules.  
Management wants to protect these files from unauthorized access.  Since these files 
contain personal employee information, such as pay amounts and employee evaluations, 
as well as management’s plans to layoff some employees after the NG game has been 
completed, they have been classified VG PROPRIETARY. 
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The rest of the company’s employees have great interest in seeing these files especially 
the programmers who face potential layoffs.  Only management should gain access to 
this asset.   
 
E-MAIL - E-mail provides a means of communications amongst employees and, 
if connected to the Internet, with people outside of the company.  It is provided as a 
means to conduct company business, however it is used often for personal 
correspondence as well. 
General company e-mail is not considered to be sensitive and is, therefore, 
classified Non-Sensitive.  Its compromise presents little risk to the company. 
Although company e-mail is not classified VentureGames’ management would 
prefer that only company employees gain access to it.  
 
VG Web - This is the VentureGames’ web site.  It provides information about 
games being developed, company contact information, and links to download free game 
versions, patches, and updates. It is the face of the company to its customers. 
The information on this asset has been cleared for public release and poses no 
threat to the company. However if it is vandalized or defaced it could harm the 
company’s reputation. 
The web site should be read accessible by the general public as well as the 
VentureGames’ employees but should not be written to or modified by unauthorized 
users. 
 
Marketing Research - Marketing Research is used to determine consumer 
demand and trends.   It is provided by a national marketing association and is a database 
containing current consumer trends such as, consumer likes and dislikes, age group, 
ethnic, and gender based purchasing patterns, and consumer preferences.  This national 
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database is essential for small marketing firms and independent marketers for getting the 
latest and most accurate marketing data available. 
This asset is for public use and is maintained and supported by a remote site (not 
belonging to VentureGames).  It posses no threat to the company and has a Non-Sensitive 
classification.  This asset should be accessible by the general public. 
 
E.  ASSET GOALS 
Key aspects of the assets are the goals the virtual users have concerning accessing 
those assets.  Each asset goal has an asset associated with it.  These asset goals are 
assigned to the virtual users and determine their goals in the game.  Virtual users can 
have a single or multiple asset goals.  The asset goals can all be instantiated at the outset 
of the game, so that the player can meet them all early in the scenario, or they can be 
instantiated during the game play, to provide variety to the game scenario or stress on the 
player to meet new goals that may conflict with previously made decisions.  This 
flexibility provides the game scenario designer with the ability to model the changing real 
world demands that IT personnel face.    
The following are the descriptions of each of the asset goals included in the 
VentureGames’ scenario: 
 
Write NG Game Code - The goal is to be able to access the NG Game Code and 
modify it as necessary. The NG Game Code requires a word processing program to 
access it. 
 
Maintain Legacy Code - The goal is to be able to access the Legacy Code in 
order to maintain it.  The Legacy Code requires a word processing program to access it. 
 
Access Employee Files - The goal is to be able to access the employee files so 
that they can be updated and reviewed. The Employee files require a Word Processing 
program and management program to access them. 
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Develop Marketing Plan - The goal is to be able to access the Marketing Plan so 
that they can be updated and reviewed.  The Marketing Plans require a Word Processing 
program to access them. 
 
Access E-MAIL - The goal is to be able to access E-MAIL so that users can send 
and receive correspondence.   To access E-MAIL an E-MAIL Client and server are 
required. 
 
Research Marketing Data - The goal is to be able to access the online Marketing 
Research database.  In order to access the Marketing Research data, a web browser is 
required. 
 
Access Web Site - The goal is to be able to access the VentureGames’ Web Site in 
order to gather information about games currently being developed, get company 
information, download patches and/or updates to games, and to download free games 
and/or other content provided by the company.  
 
F. VIRTUAL USERS 
Virtual users are the simulated agents, typically employees, within each scenario 
who interact within the virtual environment and are affected by the decision made by the 
player.  Virtual user’s happiness and productivity, which are determined by their ability 
to meet their goals, contribute to the financial success of the enterprise.  Unhappy and 
unproductive virtual users are not only a detriment to the financial success of the 
enterprise; they are also a detriment to the protection of classified information.  
Several aspects of the virtual user are established within the Scenario Definition 
file.  These aspects include the virtual user’s name, job description, discretionary access 
groups, mandatory clearances, trustworthiness, asset goals, training, happiness, and 
productivity.  Each of these virtual user aspects is defined in detail in the CyberCIEGE 
encyclopedia, which is included in the game.  
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In addition to the virtual users, who act as the company’s employees, the Scenario 
Definition File allows for the creation of an enterprise support staff.  These agents make 
up both the IT support personnel and the security guard detail that can be employed 
within the scenario.  These support agents are different from the virtual users in that the 
player can hire and fire them at will, and in that their salaries come out of the player’s IT 
budget, where as the enterprise’s virtual users’ salaries do not.   The goal of the player is 
to facilitate the company employees’ ability to meet their asset goals.  This is 
accomplished through the procurement of components, establishment of networks, and 




The following is a description of the virtual users that make up the employees in 
the VentureGames’ CyberCIEGE scenario.  These users are instantiated at the outset of 
the game and cannot be hired or fired by the player. Their productivity, happiness, and 
ability to reach their goals will affect the finances of the company in either a positive or 
negative way.  To successfully complete the scenario the player must make decisions that 
facilitate these users in accomplishing their goals while protecting the assets from 
unauthorized access.  
 
Paul - Paul is the lead programmer and project manager for the NG game. Its 
development is his only task.  He is a phenomenal programmer, can code anything, loves 
what he does and works hard.  Gets very upset very fast if he can’t access his stuff 
because of “network” problems.  An “Open Source” advocate, he hates to use 
proprietary software.  He knows about network security but doesn’t always practice it. 
He is highly trustworthy, and can be counted on to be very productive.  Paul holds a 
SIERRA level clearance and belongs to the Programmer, Company, and Public DAC 
groups.   
His main goal in the game is to develop the NG game code.  A secondary goal 
Paul has is to access his email account.  To be productive and happy, Paul needs access 
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to the NG game code all the time, while his access to his e-mail is only required after he 
requests it.  Paul needs access to productivity software to do his job.  If he does not have 
this access it will negatively affect his productivity and happiness.  Paul would prefer to 
have access to the game code and his e-mail from a single workstation, however if Paul 
can only access these assets on separate machines his productivity and happiness will 
only suffer a minor negative impact.  
 
Carl – Carl is a new programmer at VentureGames.  He has been hired to 
maintain the legacy code so that Paul can focus on the NG game code.  He is a recent 
Graduate from the University for the Super Smart.  He is from the MTV generation and 
not only knows programming but networks too (he may have even done some hacking 
before).  He likes his new job but only sees it as a rung on his ladder to success.  Carl 
holds a VG PROPRIETARY level clearance and belongs to the Programmer, Company, 
and Public DAC groups.   
His main goal in the game is to maintain the legacy game code.  Carl’s secondary 
goal is to access his email account.  To be productive and happy, Carl needs access to 
both the NG game code and his e-mail account at all times.  Carl needs access to 
productivity software to do his job.  If he does not have this access it will negatively affect 
his productivity and happiness, however his happiness will be more affected by an 
inability to access his e-mail than accessing the legacy code.    Carl would prefer to have 
access to the game code and his e-mail from a single workstation, however if he can only 
access these assets on separate machines his productivity and happiness will only be 
affected slightly 
 
Bob - Bob is the founder of the company.  He is an expert programmer, easily as 
good if not better than Paul.  Bob and Paul are best friends.  Bob is determined to get 
this company into the big time. Bob hired YOU! Much like Paul, Bob knows a great deal 
about programming but isn’t a big “networks” guy.  He knows all the security issues but 
is prone to overlook them if they are hindering the company’s goal of writing code. Bob 
has hired you to deal with all these issues and is very supportive but does not always 
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follow through with actions. Bob thinks programmers are great and network guys just 
weren’t smart enough to be programmers!  Bob holds a SIERRA level clearance and 
belongs to the Management, Company, and Public DAC groups.   
 His main goal is to access the employee files and read his e-mail.   Bob needs 
access to productivity software to do his job.  To be productive and happy, Bob needs 
access to these assets from one machine and at all times.  If Bob has to use separate 
machines to reach his goals it will not affect significantly his productivity but will cause 
him to become very unhappy.   
 
Mark - Mark handles the office.  He maintains the company’s administrative files.  
He also answers the phones and greets visitors. He is not technically savvy.  Mark likes 
to talk and is very personable. He has no clue how a network operates or what it means 
to be secure, he does however love to get and send e-mail and download cool things for 
his desktop.  Mark holds a VG PROPRIETARY level clearance and belongs to the 
Management, Company, and Public DAC groups.   
His goals are to access the employee files and read & write e-mail. Mark needs 
access to productivity software to do his job.  Mark wants access to these assets at all 
times.  If he can’t access the employee files his productivity will take a hit.  If he cannot 
access his e-mail his happiness will be negatively affected. 
 
Sally - Sally’s job is to build demand for the NG game.  She wants to build a buzz 
about it to garner interest from the gaming public.  She is not computer savvy at all, but a 
great marketing person.  She wastes a lot of IT personnel time with routine and mundane 
problems.  She often forgets passwords, leaves herself logged in, and habitually tries to 
download “cute stuff” for her computer.  Sally holds a VG PROPRIETARY level 
clearance and belongs to the Management, Company, and Public DAC groups.   
Her primary goal is to develop the marketing plan.  To do this Sally will require access to 
the Internet so that she can conduct market research on a database at a remote site.  An 
additional goal for Sally is to access her e-mail account.  To meet each of her goals, she 
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requires access to productivity software.  For Sally to be both productive and happy, she 
needs access to these assets at all times and from one machine, if not her productivity 
and happiness will suffer a major negative impact.   
 
2. External Users 
The following user is a static user in the game.  He is not an employee of 
VentureGames and therefore cannot be hired, fired or modified by the player.   The 
customer only appears in the final module (module 5) of this scenario.   
 
Customer – Customer represents the external customers of VentureGames.  His 
goal is to gain access to the VentureGames’ web site.  Customers can be good-natured 
and simply want information concerning the company, its currently available games, or 
games it has in production or they can have more devious intentions in mind.  The player 
does not know what these intentions are, however to be successful in the game the player 
must provide the access necessary for the customer to meet his stated goal while 
simultaneously protecting VentureGames’ assets against the customer gaining any more 
access than is required.   Customer holds a Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to the 
Public DAC group. 
 
3. IT Staff 
Included in the game are a group of virtual users that can be hired or fired by the 
player.  These virtual users make up the support staff.  The player can choose to hire IT 
professionals to maintain and update the network and components, to hire security guards 
to increase physical security for the entire office or simply in one zone, or to hire both.  
The following are brief descriptions of each virtual user; more detailed information on 
each is available in the SDF.   
The following are the potential IT employees the player can hire to ensure 
availability and maintenance of the components and network: 
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Dan – Dan is an experienced IT professional but does not have a college degree.  
He is a hard worker but sometimes has an attitude if he thinks people look down at him 
for not having a degree.  Dan is extremely trustworthy and competent in his job but is 
prone to complaining.  He can be hired at a salary of $1300 per month. Dan holds a 
Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to the Company and Public DAC groups. 
 
Warren – Warren graduated with honors with a degree in Computer Science and 
is certified in several areas but he lacks actual work experience. He is trustworthy and is 
very well trained.  He is a very positive person and gets along with people very well. He 
can be hired for $1400 per month.  He holds a Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to 
the Company and Public DAC groups. 
 
J.D.– J.D. has over 20 years of IT experience.  He is an expert in both software 
and hardware.  He has numerous certifications in network and IA security.  J.D. is the 
consummate professional, knows his job, gets along with people and is a positive 
influence on his fellow employees.  He can be hired for $1500 per month. He holds a 
Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to the Company and Public DAC groups. 
 
4. Security Guards 
The following are the potential security employees the player can hire to ensure 
the physical protection of the company’s valuable assets: 
 
Klaus – Klaus is very good with people and a hard worker but he tends to not do 
his job if distracted.  He is trustworthy and competent at his job. He can be hired for 




Axel – Axel is very strict and disciplined. He is very trustworthy but often rubs 
people the wrong way.  He is an expert in the field of security.  He can be hired for $1300 
per month.  He holds a Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to the Public DAC group. 
 
Hans – Hans is a good security guard and gets along well with the staff.  He is 
very trustworthy and is a productive employee.  He can be hired for $1200 per month.  
He holds a Non-Sensitive clearance and belongs to the Public DAC group. 
 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a description of the VentureGames’ CyberCIEGE 
scenario and the key aspects of it.  The policies, assets, asset goals, and virtual users that 
make up the game have been introduced and a brief description provided.  Additional 
details concerning these aspects, as well as issues concerning game play, are more 
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V.  TESTING 
A. TEST STRATEGY 
The CyberCIEGE game engine is complex and non-deterministic in nature and 
therefore it is difficult to predict its exact behavior when executing a scenario definition 
file. In addition, the development of the scenario definition files themselves is a very 
complex task, which affords ample opportunity for errors to be introduced, that can affect 
the game engine’s performance.  Therefore, the strategy chosen to test the game engine’s 
performance was to develop a small set of test cases, which model a specific aspect of 
security, and predict the outcome of these test cases.  From these initial test cases, more 
complex test cases were incrementally developed.  The results of these test cases were 
collected and weighed against the results that were predicted prior to executing the game.  
The culminating outcome of these test cases verifies that the game engine is able to 
accept a customized SDF and execute a game simulation that models the real world in an 
acceptable manner. 
The testing approach used for validating the CyberCIEGE game engine’s 
performance is the Verification Validation and Accreditation (VV&A) [DMSO2 2003] 
process.  Specifically, the face validation process of VV&A was utilized in the testing 
phase of this thesis.  Face validations is defined as: 
The process of determining whether a model or simulation seems 
reasonable to people who are knowledgeable about the system under 
study, based on performance.  This process does not review the software 
code or logic, but rather reviews the inputs and outputs to ensure that they 
appear realistic or representative. [DOD 1997] 
The CyberCIEGE game engine has two key aspects regarding its verification that 
lend itself to the face validation process.  First, it is nondeterministic in nature, i.e. a 
specific action or setting is expected to occur with a certain probability rather than as a 
direct function. Second, the resultant outcome of an action cannot be measured by 
quantitative means, it must be examined using qualitative measures to determine its 
acceptance or not. 
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In the face validation process designed for this thesis the developer of the SDF 
acted as the subject matter expert for the test.  This facilitated both the development of 
the test SDFs for game engine validation and the playable game scenario SDFs, while 
keeping the test phase of the thesis within the scope of the thesis schedule.  Additionally, 
this approach to testing the game engine provided numerous test cases that can later be 
incorporated into a high level, overall test strategy.   
Finally, it is important to identify that the test phase for this thesis occurred while 
the game engine was still being adjusted and modified to meet the CyberCIEGE project’s 
specifications.  This was also the case for the Scenario Template Format (SFT), which is 
the document that identifies the games parameters and settings. Therefore, the test cases 
in the following chapter have been tested on more than one version of the game engine.  
 
B. TEST CASES 
This section identifies and describes the most significant test cases conducted 
during the test phase. Each of the following test cases is laid out in a similar three-tiered 
format.  The first section describes the test case, defines the scope of the test case, and 
references the educational goal it relates to. The second section defines the results the test 
case developer expects to occur during the game’s simulation.  Finally, the third section 
identifies the actual results of the game simulation.  
The test cases were developed in incremental steps, from simple to complex, in 
order to limit errors caused by poorly constructed scenario definition files.  Each test case 
has multiple testing variations, such as high physical security or low attacker motives.  
These variations are needed to ensure that the game engine properly identifies and 
simulates the numerous variables that compose the realm of Information Assurance and 
Network Security. 
 
1.  Test Case 1 “Physical Security” 
a.  Test Goal and Design 
Physical security is a fundamental security measure in protecting 
information.  In this test case the concept of physical security is introduced and modeled.  
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The goal of this test case was to identify whether the game engine modeled the basic 
issues involved with protecting classified information by physical security means alone in 
an acceptable manner.  Additionally, it identified some basic security measures that can 
be utilized to provide security for confidential information.   
In this test case, there is one user, Paul, who has an asset goal of writing 
the Next Generation (NG) Game Code.  This asset, NG Game Code, has been instantiated 
on Paul’s workstation, which is located in a walled office that has access control 
established in the form of various physical security measures, i.e. a cipher lock on the 
door.  Paul’s computer is not connected to any networks and only Paul has permissions to 
access this asset.   
To conduct this test case the attacker motivation and the degree of 
physical security provided were adjusted, i.e. high attacker motivation and low physical 
security, in each execution of the test case.  All other aspects of the test case remained 
constant through each subsequent execution of the test case.  These permutations, of the 
test case, were essential for validating that the game engine properly recognized the 
differing degrees of motivation and protection possible in the real world, and model a 
realistic outcome.  The following list identifies the title of each physical security test case 











b. Expected Results 
Each of the individual test scenarios for the physical security test case 
should produce slightly different results.  Since all aspects of the test, except the attacker 
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motivation and the degree of physical protection utilized to protect a classified asset, 
remain constant any variations in the test case outcomes can be attributed to the chosen 
test variables.  The following table delineates each test scenario with the test designer’s 















VGTest1a. 0 9 100 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will be compromised and his 
workstation will eventually be 
stolen. 
VGTest1b. 0 9 400 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will be compromised and his 
workstation will eventually be 
stolen. 
VGTest1c. 0 9 800 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will be compromised and his 
workstation will eventually be 
stolen. 
VGTest1d. 182 203 100 Paul will have access to the asset 
and it will not be compromised.  
His workstation will not be stolen. 
VGTest1e. 182 203 400 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will be compromised.  His 
workstation will not be stolen. 
VGTest1f. 182 203 800 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will be compromised.  His 
workstation will not be stolen. 
VGTest1g. 357 394 100 Paul will have access to the asset 
and it will not be compromised.  
His workstation will not be stolen. 
VGTest1h. 357 394 400 Paul will have access to the asset 
and it will not be compromised.  
His workstation will not be stolen. 
VGTest1i. 357 394 800 Paul will have access to the asset 
but it will eventually be 
compromised due to the high 
attacker motivation.  His 
workstation will not be stolen. 
Table 2. VGTest1 Expected Results 
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c. Actual Results 
The test scenarios were developed and executed while the CyberCIEGE 
game engine was still being updated, modified, and refined.  Therefore, each test scenario 
was executed using the same version of the game engine to ensure that no anomalies 
resulted due to the differences in the game engines.  During the execution of the test case 
the results produced by each of the test scenarios were observed, during the test’s 
execution, to determine if the game simulation was realistic.  Once the game concluded 
the game results were then inspected through the use of the scenario’s results file3 and 
log file,4 which are provided by the game engine.  These results were then compared to 
the results the test designer expected prior to the game’s execution.   
The following table presents the actual results and identifies whether they 




Actual Results Met 
Expectations 
VGTest1a. 
The test case met expected results.  Paul was a happy and 
productive worker while he had access to his workstation 
and the asset.  The asset was disclosed almost 
immediately.  Both MAC and DAC attacks occurred and 
the workstation was eventually stolen.  Once Paul’s 




The test case met expected results.  Paul was a happy and 
productive worker while he had access to his workstation 
and the asset.  The asset was disclosed almost 
immediately.  Both MAC and DAC attacks occurred and 
the workstation was eventually stolen.  Once Paul’s 




The test case met expected results.  Paul was a happy and 
productive worker while he had access to his workstation 
and the asset.  The asset was disclosed almost 
immediately.  Both MAC and DAC attacks occurred and 
the workstation was eventually stolen.  Once Paul’s 
workstation was stolen, his productivity and happiness 
Yes 
                                                 
3  The game engine creates a results file during the game.  It annotates the key aspects of the game’s 
activity such as which attacks occurred and why they occurred. 
4  The log file captures all game activity to include the scenario’s setup and creation.  This file aids in 




Paul remained a happy and productive worker for the 
duration of the test (1 month).  Paul’s workstation was 
never stolen and remained available to him.  The asset 
was not disclosed. 
Yes 
VGTest1e. 
Paul remained a happy and productive worker for the 
duration of the test (1 month).  Paul’s workstation was 
never stolen and remained available to him.  An external 
attacker disclosed the asset. 
Yes 
VGTest1f. 
Paul remained a happy and productive worker for the 
duration of the test (1 month).  Paul’s workstation was 
never stolen and remained available to him.  An external 
attacker disclosed the asset. 
Yes 
VGTest1g. 
Paul was a productive and happy worker, but did not like 
all the security requirements imposed on him. The asset 
was not disclosed and the workstation was not stolen. 
Yes 
VGTest1h. 
Paul was a productive and happy worker, but did not like 
all the security requirements imposed on him. The asset 
was not disclosed and the workstation was not stolen. 
Yes 
VGTest1i. 
Paul was a productive and happy worker, but did not like 
all the security requirements imposed on him. The asset 
was eventually disclosed but the workstation was not 
stolen. 
Yes 
Table 3. VGTest1 Actual Results 
 
The results of these test scenarios met the test designer’s expectations. The 
asset, if left unprotected, was either quickly disclosed or the workstation containing it 
was stolen.  Increasing the amount of physical security allowed the asset to be protected 
and increased the amount of attacker motivation required to compromise the asset or steal 
the workstation.  The final test scenario, high physical security and high attacker 
motivation, demonstrated the inherent failings of providing physical security alone and 
highlighted the need for additional protective measures, i.e. password protection and 
access controls, for protecting high value, confidential assets. 
 
2. Test Case 2 “Intranet” 
a.  Test Goal and Design 
Test Case 2 introduces two new users to the game.  First there is Mark, the 
company secretary.  Mark is an un-trusted user and holds a low security clearance.  He 
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works in the main office and handles the personnel files of the company on his 
workstation.  Since these personnel files are classified Non-Sensitive, Mark’s workstation 
does not have any physical protection; it sits on his desk in the open office.   
The second new user is Sally.  Sally is in charge of marketing 
VentureGames’ products.  Her marketing plans are classified VG PROPRIETARY and 
must be protected from unauthorized disclosure.  Sally’s classified marketing plans are 
located in her office; therefore, her office has high (935) physical security, i.e. cipher 
locks, guards, and alarms, established to protect it.  The rest of the office has low physical 
security (52) established to protect against theft only.  Additionally, in this test case there 
is a newly installed VentureGames’ intranet that its employees can connect to.   
The high value asset that requires protection, in this test case, is the VG 
marketing plan located in Sally’s office.  Since this office has high (935) physical 
security established compromise of the asset through physical means is highly unlikely, 
thereby making the intranet connection the most likely vulnerability to the high value 
asset.  Therefore, the goal of this test case was to identify whether the game engine 
modeled the issues involved with protecting classified information, residing on a 
workstation, connected to an intranet in an acceptable manner.  This included validating 
that the game engine properly modeled firewalls and their filters.  The following list 






b. Expected Results  
In general, the expected results of these test cases are that an unauthorized 
user will gain access to the VG Marketing Plans, on Sally’s workstation, by utilizing 
Mark’s insecure computer.  Since the high value asset is located in a highly secure room, 
the intranet connection is the most likely vulnerability the classified asset faces.  In each 
of the scenarios, for this test case, only the intranet connection was altered from scenario 
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to scenario.  Physical security for the entire VentureGames’ office building, and for the 
highly secured walled office, remained constant throughout each test scenario.   
The following table delineates each test scenario with the test designer’s 





Parameters Expected Results 
VGTest2a. Sally’s workstation is not connected to the Intranet. 
Sally will be able to access the 
marketing plans and they will 
not be disclosed. 
VGTest2b. 
Sally’s workstation is connected to the 
intranet via a router.  There is no 
protection against the network. 
Sally will be able to access the 
marketing plans however the 
lack of protection from the 
network will result in their 
unauthorized disclosure. 
VGTest2c. 
Sally’s workstation is connected to the 
intranet via a firewall.  The firewall is 
configured to block all traffic in both 
directions.  This should be similar to 
having no connection to the intranet. 
Sally will be able to access the 
marketing plans and the firewall 
will protect the asset from 
unauthorized disclosure. 
VGTest2d. 
Sally’s workstation is connected to the 
intranet via a firewall.  The firewall is 
configured to block all traffic in to her 
workstation while allowing her access to 
the employee files out on the intranet. 
Sally will be able to access the 
marketing plans and the firewall 
will protect the asset from 
unauthorized disclosure. 
Table 4. VGTest2 Expected Results 
 
c. Actual Results 
The test scenarios for Test Case 2 were conducted in the same fashion as 
those in Test Case 1, i.e. observed during execution and results files inspected after test 
completion.  Additionally, for testing consistency, all test cases were conducted using the 
same CyberCIEGE game engine.  The results of the test scenarios varied from scenario to 
scenario, therefore, the following table provides a summary of the actual results 









Sally was able to access her office and workstation.  She 




Sally was able to access her office and workstation.  She 
had access to the marketing plans, but the plans were 
compromised through the unprotected network connection 
Yes 
VGTest2c. 
Sally was able to access her office and workstation.  She 
had access to the marketing plans, but the plans were 
compromised even though they were being protected by a 
firewall with filters set to block all traffic in and out. 
No 
VGTest2d. 
Sally was able to access her office and workstation.  She 
had access to the VG Marketing Plans on her workstation 
and access to the employee files on the intranet.  However, 
the marketing plans were compromised even though they 
were being protected by a firewall with filters set to block 
all traffic coming in to Sally’s system. 
No 
Table 5. VGTest2 Actual Results 
 
In this set of tests, both test scenarios VGTest2a and VGTest2b met 
expectations.  In test scenario VGTest2a, Sally’s workstation had no network connection 
and was located in a highly protected office (physical security set to 900+).  Thus it 
should have remained secure, with an attacker motivation of 300, and it did.  In test 
scenario VGTest2b, Sally’s workstation was connected to the network, but no network 
protection was provided.  Therefore, the marketing plans should have been disclosed, and 
they were.   
Test scenarios VGTest2c and VGTest2d were designed to test the game 
engines ability to model the functionality that a firewall provides.  In test scenario 
VGTest2c, a firewall was used to logically separate Sally’s workstation from the rest of 
the network.  The firewall filters were set to block all network traffic into and out of 
Sally’s personal intranet.  The results of this test scenario should have been similar to 
those of test scenario VGTest2a, in which there was no connection to the network.  
Sally’s workstation, and the classified asset, should have been secure, however the 
CyberCIEGE game engine did not properly model the functionality provided by a 
firewall and its filters.  The classified asset was not protected and Sally’s workstation was 
not logically isolated from the rest of the network.  
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 In test scenario VGTest2d, the firewalls were utilized to logically isolate 
Sally’s workstation from the rest of the network while still enabling her to gain access to 
an asset through the intranet.  This test scenario, like the previous one, was designed to 
validate whether the game engine properly modeled the functionality of firewalls and 
their filters.  The firewall filters were set to allow Sally access out to the intranet while 
simultaneously blocking access into her system and from it.  While Sally was able to gain 
access to the intranet, the firewall failed to protect the classified asset located on her 
protected system.   
Test Case 2 successfully identified an area of concern with the 
CyberCIEGE game engine.  The results of these test scenarios, failure of the 
CyberCIEGE game engine to properly model the functionality provided by firewalls and 
filters, have been forwarded to the game engine developers for correction.  As of the date 
of the writing of this thesis, this issue has not yet been corrected.  
 
3.  Test Case 3 “Internet” 
a. Test Goal and Design 
Connection to an external network (Internet) introduces numerous new 
vulnerabilities that have to be addressed in order to ensure confidentiality.  In Test case 3 
the need for just such a connection is introduced.   The goal of this test case is to identify 
the basic secrecy issues involved with connecting to an external network and to identify 
some basic measures that can be taken to provide security for confidential information 
For testing purposes, all of the “Internet” test scenarios will have a high 
level of physical security.  This will focus the test case on the Internet connection as 
being the potential vulnerability for the confidentiality requirement.  Security measure on 
the workstation, such as virus protection and patches, will not be implemented in order to 
focus the test on the security provided by the network security measures put in place.  
Sally is in charge of marketing at VentureGames.  She is a trusted user and 
possesses a security clearance.    Sally’s goal is to access the VG Marketing Data (asset) 
on her workstation.  Her workstation is connected to the Internet.  The Marketing Data on 
Sally’s workstation is confidential information and needs protection.  Sally is the only 
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user authorized to enter her office (zone) and to access her workstation.  The overall goal 
of this test case is to identify game configurations that protect the classified information 
on Sally’s workstation from unauthorized access and to determine whether the 
CyberCIEGE game engine properly models the scenarios. 
To conduct this test case, six smaller test scenarios were developed.  These 
smaller test scenarios each focused on different game configurations and aspects of 
Internet connection.  The configurations in the test scenarios are: No Internet connection, 
Internet connection through a router, Internet connection through a firewall with no 
filters, Internet connection through a firewall that blocks all traffic in and out, Internet 
connection through a firewall that blocks all traffic in and out except telnet, and an 
Internet connection through a firewall that blocks all traffic in and out except email and 
web browsing.  These smaller scenarios are needed to identify the effects of different 
network configurations on the protection of the classified asset.  The titles of each of 








b. Expected Results 
In this set of test scenarios Sally should have access to her office, her 
workstation, and the VG Marketing Data.  Each test scenario will then change the 
network configuration only, to validate that the game engine properly identifies and 
models the vulnerabilities associated with connecting to the Internet.  Additionally, these 
test scenarios will identify security measures that the player can take to mitigate these 
vulnerabilities.  There are six test scenarios in this test case.  Each of the Test Case 3 
scenarios was executed several times.  In each execution all parameters remained 
constant, except the attacker motivation.  Attacker motivation was changed (00, 25, 50, 
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100, 400, 800) in each scenario to determine if the game engine recognized the difference 
in attacker motivation and properly escalated the attack.   
In general, when the scenarios had lower attack motivations the 
vulnerabilities associated with the Internet connection should be less accessible than 
when the attacker motivation was elevated.  For example, in the test scenario with no 
Internet connection, VGTest3a, the classified asset should be protected from 
unauthorized disclosure, regardless of the attacker motivation, since the physical 
protection afforded (835) is greater than the maximum attacker motivation (800) tested.  
While in scenario VGTest3b, where the workstation is connected to the Internet through a 
router, there should be numerous vulnerabilities that the game engine should identify.  
The game engine should also utilize these vulnerabilities to gain access to the classified 
information.  In this test scenario the asset should be disclosed rather easily.  Changing 
the connection to the Internet from a router to a firewall, in VGTest3c, should provide 
some protection for the asset.  At very low attacker motives the asset should be protected 
but as the attacker motive increases the asset should be easily accessed and disclosed.  
Adding filters to the firewall, in VGTest3d, that block all network traffic in and out 
should provide sufficient protection to the asset so that it is not disclosed at any attacker 
motivation in the test.  This scenario should have results that are similar to the no Internet 
connection scenario, VGTest3a.  In the fifth test scenario, VGTest3e, all traffic except for 
Telnet is blocked in both directions.  Permitting the use of Telnet provides the attacker 
with a vulnerability that can be used to access the classified information.  The asset 
should eventually be disclosed through this vulnerability.  The final test scenario, 
VGTest3f, models a common configuration in the corporate world.  The firewall is 
configured to block all traffic except for web browsers and email from coming in or out 
of the network.  Web browsing and email communications are often paramount to the 
productive and happy performance of a company’s employees, however they do provide 
a vulnerability that an attacker can use to gain access to the classified information.  For 
this test scenario, the game engine should identify this vulnerability and utilize it to 
disclose the classified information.  
The following table provides a summary of the test parameters for each 








VGTest3a. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room and are 
not connected to the Internet.   
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
will not be disclosed regardless of 
attacker motive. 
VGTest3b. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room. Her 
workstation is connected to the 
Internet via a router.  There is no 
network protection in place. 
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
will be disclosed through the 
unprotected Internet connection as 
the attacker motivation increases. 
VGTest3c. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room. Her 
workstation is connected to the 
Internet via a firewall.  There are 
no filters set.  
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
will be disclosed through the 
unprotected Internet connection as 
the attacker motivation increases. 
VGTest3d. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room. Her 
workstation is connected to the 
Internet via a firewall.  The 
firewall filters are set to block all 
network traffic coming in and 
going out. 
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
will not be disclosed regardless of 
attacker motive.  The firewall 
should logically separate Sally’s 
workstation from the Internet so 
that no unauthorized access is 
gained. 
VGTest3e. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room. Her 
workstation is connected to the 
Internet via a firewall.  The 
firewall filters are set to block all 
network traffic coming in and 
going out, except for Telnet. 
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
should eventually be disclosed as 
the attacker motive increases.  Since 
the Telnet access provides a 
vulnerability that a highly 
motivated attacker should be able to 
use to gain unauthorized access. 
VGTest3f. Sally’s workstation and the 
classified asset are located in a 
highly secure (835) room. Her 
workstation is connected to the 
Internet via a firewall.  The 
firewall filters are set to block all 
network traffic coming in and 
going out, except for e-mail and 
web browsers. 
Sally will have access to her office, 
workstation and the asset.  The asset 
should eventually be disclosed as 
the attacker motive increases.  Since 
the e-mail and web browser access 
provide vulnerabilities that a highly 
motivated attacker should be able to 
use to gain unauthorized access. 
Table 6. VGTest3 Expected Results 
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c. Actual Results 
The test scenarios, for Test Case 3, were conducted in the same fashion as 
the previous two test cases, i.e. the game simulation was observed during execution and 
results and log files were inspected after test completion.  All test parameters remained 
constant in each test scenario except for the degree of attacker motivation.  The attacker’s 
motive, for gaining unauthorized access to the confidential asset, varied (0, 25, 50, 100, 
200, 800), in each execution of the test scenario.  This was done in order to test both the 
degree of security provided by each network component and the game engine’s ability to 
recognize vulnerabilities and properly model attacks based on them.   
 The following table provides a summary of the actual results experienced 
and identifies whether they met the test designer’s expectations: 
 
Test 




Sally was able to access her office, workstation, and the 
marketing plans.  The plans were not compromised at any 
level of attacker motivation. 
Yes 
VGTest3b. 
Sally was able to access her office, workstation, and the 
marketing plans.  The plans were compromised; however, 




Sally was able to access her office, workstation, and the 
marketing plans.  The plans were compromised; however, 
the compromise did not occur until the attacker motivation 
reached 25.  (It would have been preferable if the firewall 
had been slightly more secure than a router but this was not 
a requirement for this test.) 
Yes 
VGTest3d. 
Sally was able to access her office, workstation, and the 
marketing plans.  The plans were not compromised and 
were protected by the firewall with filters set to block all 
network traffic in and out. The results were similar to 
VGTest3a, no internet connection. 
Yes 
VGTest3fe. 
Sally was able to access her office, workstation, and the 
marketing plans.  The plans were compromised, however, 
the compromise did not occur until an attacker value of 
200.   
Yes 
VGTest3f. 
Sally was able to access her office and workstation.  She 
had access to the VG Marketing Plans.  The plans were 
compromised.  The compromise occurred at an attacker 
No 
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value of 25.  This put the attack in the range of amateur 
hackers and script kiddies.   
Table 7. VGTest3 Actual Results 
 
The results of Test Case 3 met, for the most part, the expectations of the 
test designer.  Unprotected Internet access resulted in the compromise of classified assets, 
at even low attacker motives, while providing network security components, i.e. 
firewalls, provided some protection from unauthorized access via the Internet.  
Additionally the game engine properly simulated the types of attacks (i.e. Trojan horse 
and Hacker attacks) and increased both the number and success of the attacks as the 
attacker motive was escalated.   
One discrepancy identified during this test was the performance of the 
firewalls and filters.  In Test Case 2, utilizing a firewall to isolate and protect a classified 
system from an Intranet, the firewalls and filters provided no security to the classified 
asset.  However, in Test Case 3, utilizing a firewall to protect classified system from the 
Internet, the firewall and filters performed as the test designer expected.  This 
discrepancy, in the performance of firewalls, was identified and forwarded to the 





The test cases developed for this thesis were designed to test some basic aspects 
concerning the confidentiality of classified information and to validate whether the 
CyberCIEGE game engine properly modeled and simulated these aspects.  Overall the 
tests conducted were successful.  Numerous test scenarios were developed to test the 
game engine.  These test scenarios were designed to challenge the game engine in a 
different way and to isolate and identify its ability to properly model and simulate, in a 
realistic manner, the virtual environment developed by the test designer.   
Several areas of concern with the game engine were identified through these tests. 
Some of these concerns were minor, and were immediately corrected.  Some concerns 
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were corrected in subsequent revisions of the game engine, while other concerns, about 
the game engine’s performance, have yet to be addressed.  Follow-on testing, and 
improvements to the game engine are still necessary, but the results of these tests show 






VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. CyberCIEGE Game Play Issues 
The conduct of this thesis coincided with the development of the CyberCIEGE 
game engine.  Numerous versions of the game engine were utilized during this thesis.  As 
issues concerning the game engine’s performance arose they were immediately identified 
and forwarded to the game engine developers.  However, not all of the issues identified 
have been addressed or corrected by the completion date of this thesis.  Therefore, there 
remain some game play issues in the current version of the game.  Some of these game 
play issues are major concerns that affect the overall function of the game (i.e. firewalls) 
and have been addressed, both in this thesis and by other means, while others are not as 
critical, but do affect the training and entertainment value, as well as the game’s 
playability.   
The following sections identify some recommended improvements to the 
CyberCIEGE game.  These improvements, if incorporated into the game engine prior to 
its official release, will improve the overall playability of the game and thus its successful 
launch as an Information Assurance Virtual Laboratory. 
 
a. Firewalls 
Firewalls represent an essential tool, in both civilian and military, network 
defense.  They are one of the most common, and effective, means for isolating internal 
networks and protecting classified information.  The firewall component in the 
CyberCIEGE game does not currently function in a realistic manner.   There were several 
areas in which the firewalls need to be corrected in the simulation engine. 
First the firewalls need to be corrected in their basic functionality.  The 
firewall, and associated filters, in the Internet test cases functioned in a reasonable 
manner, only needing some minor fine-tuning, while the firewall and filters in the 
Intranet test case did not function at all5.  The firewalls, in the CyberCIEGE game, 
                                                 
5   The same version of the game engine was used to test both the firewalls in the Internet test cases 
and the Intranet test cases. 
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represent a critical component in the defense of a network.  The basic functionality of the 
firewalls, within the game, must be addressed and corrected so that they properly 
simulate the functionality and performance of firewalls in the real world.  This is 
essential for the game to achive its educational objectives. 
The second area, which needs to be addressed, is the filtering of traffic 
into and out of the firewall.  Currently the direction of network traffic is modeled in 
relation to the network, not the firewall port in which the traffic is entering or leaving.  
This does not represent, in a realistic manner, the way an actual firewall is configured.  
The difference between the way a CyberCIEGE firewall is configured and how one in the 
real world is configured causes both confusion for the player, when attempting to utilize a 
firewall in the game, and does not properly educate the player in the basic concepts 
associated with configuring a real firewall. 
The following diagrams provide an example of the differences in the 
configuration aspects of a CyberCIEGE firewall and a real firewall.  As will be 
demonstrated in the examples, there is a difference in perspective when setting the 
firewall’s filters which can be counterintuitive to the player.  In a real world firewall, the 
filters are set with the perspective of the firewall taken into account.  This means that if a 
filter is set to block traffic in, the filter will block traffic coming into the firewall from the 
connected network.  In the CyberCIEGE game, the perspective of the network is taken.  
In these CyberCIEGE firewalls, if a filter is set to block traffic in, the filter will block 
traffic flowing from the firewall and into the network.  While these differences are easily 
overcome, once the perspective is explained to the player, they add an unnecessary 
degree of confusion to the game and do not fulfill the requirements to educate the player 
in the basic functionality of a firewall.   
In each diagram the firewall filters are set to block all traffic in for 
Network 1 and block all traffic out for Network 2.  These examples illustrate the 
differences in the flow of traffic in the two configurations. 
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Figure 1.    CyberCIEGE firewall filter performance 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the functionality experienced in a CyberCIEGE 
firewall.  In this example the firewall’s filters are set in the following manner:  Network 1 
– Block All Traffic In; Network 2 – Block All Traffic Out.  As demonstrated in this 
example, this results in all traffic flowing into Network 1 from the firerwall to be blocked 
and all traffic flowing out of Network 2 and into the firewall to be blocked.  The next 








Figure 2.   “Real” firewall filter performance 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the functionality experineced in a real world firewall.  
In this example the firewall’s filters are set in the same manner as in the first example: 
Network 1 – Block All Traffic In; Network 2 – Block All Traffic Out.  As demonstrated 
in this example, this results in all traffic flowing into the firewall from Network 1 to be 
blocked and all traffic flowing out of the firewall into Network 2 to be blocked. 
Network 1 
(Block all traffic in)
Network 2 




(Block all traffic in) 
Network 2 
(Block all traffic out) 
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These differences, between the firewalls’ functionality, are 
counterintuitive and can cause confusion for the player while plaing the game.  The 
CyberCIEGE firewalls should be adjusted so that they more accurately reflect real world 
firewall functionality.  These differences are a concern because they pose a major 
hindrance to the training and education aspects of the game as well as to its playability.  
For the CyberCIEGE project to fulfill its educational goals, the functionality of the 
firewalls within the game must be corrected. 
   
b. Virtual Users 
Each virtual user in the CyberCIEGE game has many personalization 
parameters.  These parameters establish such things as the user’s sex, description, and 
asset goals.  They also establish the user’s initial happiness and productivity levels.  
During the execution of the game, these happiness and productivity levels can be affected 
by events within the game. These events include the establishment of physical security 
measures, i.e. installing cipher locks or hiring a guard, or the user’s inability or difficulty 
in accomplishing his goal, i.e. having to use two separate workstations or having to go 
from one zone to another to accomplish this goal.   
While the virtual user sensitivity is an important aspect for both the 
game’s playability and player’s educational benefit, the current level of sensitivity needs 
to be better tuned to provide a more realistic simulation of a virtual user’s reaction to 
such events.  Additionally, a trigger or parameter should be established that allows the 
scenario designer the discretion to either turn off or on a virtual user’s sensitivity or to be 
able to better adjust it so that differences in virtual user’s personalities and backgrounds 
can be simulated.  For example, a military virtual user is going to be less sensitive to 
strict physical security measures than perhaps a civilian virtual user, while the leader of 
an organization may be more sensitive to productivity issues than an entry-level 
employee.  Fixing the CyberCIEGE game engine so that these differences in virtual user 
sensitivities can be simulated will enhance both the game’s playability and the user’s 




c. Malicious Software Occurrence 
The CyberCIEGE game engine simulates the occurrence of various types 
of malicious software.  This malicious software includes such things as computer viruses6 
and Trojan Horses7.  These types of malicious software represent a significant threat to 
the protection of information.  They are abundant and new versions of them are 
constantly being developed and released to undermine any preventative security measures 
established to counter them.  In the CyberCIEGE game, however, the persistent infection 
of these types of malicious software can be detrimental to the educational goal of the 
scenario designer.  Since the CyberCIEGE game was developed to educate players on 
numerous aspects and levels of information assurance and network security the scenario 
designer needs to have the ability to determine the amount and type of potential malicious 
software that occurs in a given scenario.  The current game configuration automatically 
introduces malicious software on low assurance components and provides constant 
ticker8 messages informing the player of the presence of this software.  
 Currently there is no way for a scenario designer to control the introduction of malicious 
software on components in the game.  Additionally, there is no way for the scenario 
designer to control, i.e. eliminate, the constant ticker message traffic scrolling across the 
screen.  The persistent occurrence of this malicious software on components and the 
constant barrage of ticker message traffic can detract from the intended educational goal 
of the scenario designer.  For example, in the physical security tests conducted for this 
thesis, a new player to the game may lose sight of his intended scenario goal, i.e. 
physically securing a classified asset, due to the constant barrage of messages identifying 
malicious software that has been installed on a workstation.  This software has no effect 
on the security of the classified asset, since the workstation is not connected to a network, 
however the player may feel the need to address this issue, thus distracting him from the 
intended educational goal of the scenario designer.  Therefore, the scenario designer 
                                                 
6 Webopedia defines a computer virus as: “A program or piece of code that is loaded onto your 
computer without your knowledge and runs against your wishes.” 
7 Webopedia defines a Trojan Horse as: “A destructive program that masquerades as a benign 
application. Unlike viruses, Trojan horses do not replicate themselves but they can be just as destructive.” 
8 A ticker message is a message to the player that scrolls across the bottom of the game screen. 
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needs a mechanism to either control or eliminate the malicious software, and associated 
message traffic, for a scenario.       
  
 2. Future Work 
This thesis focused on determining whether a CyberCIEGE scenario could be 
developed that was both educational and a playable game.  Through the use of test cases 
and the development of the VentureGames’ CyberCIEGE scenario this thesis has 
demonstrated that a playable CyberCIEGE game can be designed using Scenario 
Definition Files (SDF).  However, some modifications to the SDFs and game engine 
tuning are still required.  Additionally, this thesis demonstrated the possibility of 
designing CyberCIEGE scenarios that provide an educational benefit to the player.  This 
thesis developed a CyberCIEGE game that, when played, introduces information 
assurance and network security issues to the player in an incremental, educational, and 
entertaining manner.  However, this thesis did not provide a metric to validate or quantify 
the degree of educational benefit the player derived from the game. 
The logical next step in the development of the CyberCIEGE game is to develop a 
metric that can be used to provide quantifiable data that validates the educational benefit 
of the game.  To do this, players with an identifiable degree of pre-existing information 
assurance and network security knowledge, preferably none, must be utilized.  The 
players could be given a pre-game play questionnaire, designed to identify their pre-
existing understanding of information assurance and network security, and then a post-
game play questionnaire, designed to identify their post CyberCIEGE understanding of 
information assurance and network security.  Numerous test players will be required in 
order to obtain statistically significant data.  Once the basic premise that the game 
provides an educational benefit to the player is proven, more advanced tests must be 
conducted to identify the ability of the CyberCIEGE game to provide an educational 
benefit to a range of players with varying degrees of pre-existing information assurance 





This thesis contributes to the ongoing research involved with the CyberCIEGE 
project that is being conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.  
As stated earlier, the mission of the project is to “create an Information Assurance (IA) 
teaching/learning laboratory.”[Irvine 2003]  This thesis fulfills an essential step required 
for the project to reach its stated goals. 
This thesis answered two fundamental questions concerning the CyberCIEGE 
project.  The first question answered is: can a CyberCIEGE scenario be developed such 
that it is simultaneously a playable game and an educational tool that illustrates 
confidentiality issues in an internal corporate network connected to the Internet?  Clearly 
the answer to this question is yes.  The VentureGames’ scenario is a fully playable, five 
module, CyberCIEGE game that can both be won or lost, based on decisions the player 
makes.  The game provides ample feedback to the player in the form of ticker and pop-
up9 messages as well is in the increase and decrease of the player’s available money.  
Additionally, by incrementally increasing the complexity of the modules and expounding 
on the lessons learned from each previous one the VentureGames’ scenario provides an 
educational benefit to the player, the degree of educational benefit must be quantified in 
follow-on work. 
The second question answered by this thesis was: is it possible to validate that the 
CyberCIEGE game engine produces expected results from a predefined scenario 
definition file?  This thesis clearly demonstrates that the answer to this question is yes, as 
well.  Numerous discrepancies, failings, and performance errors in the game engine were 
identified during the testing and game development phases of this thesis.  The large 
number of these events is attributable to the fact that the CyberCIEGE game engine was 
still underdevelopment during the conduct of this thesis.  The game engine developers 
were quickly notified of these discrepancies.  Many of them were fixed immediately, 
while others are scheduled to be corrected in later versions of the game.  This clearly 
shows that a scenario designer can validate the game engine’s ability to produce results, 
that met the designer’s expectations, from a predefined scenario definition file.  
                                                 
9 A pop-up message is a message to the player that is displayed in a dialogue window that appears on 
the game screen.  The player must acknowledge the message before resuming the game. 
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Training and educating Information Technology (IT) users in the arena of 
information assurance and network security is a very complex and daunting task.  These 
users often have varying degrees of pre-existing knowledge, educational level, 
trustworthiness, and security clearances that the IT professional must take into account 
when developing a training program.   Additionally, the IT users are often not interested 
in or too busy to attend essential, and often required, IT training.  If users do attend 
training, the educational benefit derived from it is often far below what is required.  
Factor in the increasing reliance on technology to perform mission critical functions as 
well as the increased utilization of networks as a means for accessing, transmitting, and 
storing information and today’s IT professional is facing an exponentially increasing 
problem when it comes to providing essential It training to his users.   
The CyberCIEGE project provides one possible solution to this problem through 
the use of customizable scenarios that can be tailored, by the scenario designer, to meet 
the specific IT training needs of individual users.  Furthermore, the CyberCIEGE game 
provides this training in the form of an entertaining, commercial grade, computer game 
that educates while it entertains.  Additionally, since the CyberCIEGE game can be 
loaded onto any modern personal computer, or laptop computer, users can fulfill their 
training requirements from virtually anywhere, i.e. from their desk, on travel, or at home.  
This aspect of the CyberCIEGE game reduces the need to organize and schedule large, 
time consuming, mass training sessions that waste both the user and organization’s time 
and do not fully meet the training needs of either.  CyberCIEGE represents a 
revolutionary new tool that IT professionals can employ to better meet the security needs 
of their users and their organizations. 
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APPENDIX A – TEST CASES 
This Appendix contains the test case SDFs that were developed for, and described 
in, this thesis.  
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APPENDIX B – VENTUREGAMES’ SCENARIO 
This Appendix contains the VentureGames’ SDFs that were developed for, and 
described in, this thesis.  















































































APPENDIX C – VENTUREGAMES’ SCENARIO SOLUTIONS 
This Appendix contains the possible solutions to the VentureGames’ SDFs that 
were developed for, and described in, this thesis.  

















































































APPENDIX D – VENTUREGAMES’ WORKSPACE FILE 
This appendix contains the workspace files for the VentureGames CyberCIEGE 
scenario.  A workspace files determines the position of the user workspaces and which 
workspaces are active and which are not. The workspace file contains a list of data, 
which determine the direction, location, and activity (A = Active, I = inactive) of a 
workspace. This data comes in the following form: Direction, Latitude, longitude, 
activity (i.e. N 53 96 A). The first letter (N, S, E, or W,) indicates in what direction the 
workspace faces.  The location of the workspace is determined by a two number 
coordinate (latitude and longitude) of the desired workspace location within the game.  
Finally, the last letter (A or I) indicates whether the workspace is active or inactive.  
Workspaces files can be customized for each scenario to improve game play and increase 
the entertainment value of the game.  Two workspace files were used during this thesis. 
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